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ABSTRACT

An assessment of the environmental effects of the nuclear
fuel cycle industries is discussed, reactor waste inventory and
standards are presented, and the alternatives for high-level radioactive waste disposal reviewed, with particular attention being
given to disposal in deep geological formations on land.
One of the major concerns regarding potential impacts of
the nuclear fuel cycle industries is the lack of a definite and
proven method of disposal of the high-level radioactive wastes from
light water moderated reactors.

The problem is expected to become

more pressing as the nuclear power industry and the associated radioactive waste inventories grow in the strife to meet ever-increasing
demands for energy.
The current trend in waste management is tmvards reprocessing
to recover unburned uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel
and towards final disposal in deep geological formations (hard rock
or salt) on land.

Studies appear to support the viability of such

a waste management and disposal concept for high-level radioactive
wastes.

. Waldron M. McLellan, Ph.D., P. E.
Director of Research Report
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. and world demand for energy is expected to increase
almost exponentially for at least the next 20-30 years; and nuclear
po\ver is expected to play an increasingly important role as other
conventional power sources diminish (Eichholz 1977).
Ho\vever, the question of the environmental effects of the
growing nuclear industry is an issue which has attracted much public notice and emotion (Eichholz 1977).

This issue has gained par-

ticularly in interest in the wake of the Three Mile·. ~Island incident,
\vhich is the first time a general emergency has been declared (based
on radiation levels) at a commercial nuclear plant (Ferrick 1979).
In addition to reactor safety, the issue of high-level radioactive
waste disposal is of critical concern.

Unless at least one feasible

disposal option for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclearreactor fuel can be conclusively demonstrated by those nations committed to the use of nuclear energy, it is unlikely that a convincing rationale can ever be developed to show that nuclear potver
should be relied upon to supply significantly more energy in the

1980's and 1990's (Deese 1978).
JBut, whatever the conclusion may be as to the future role of
nuclear power, the fact exists that the U.S. (along with other
countries) already has a substantial inventory of high-level
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(mostly military) radioactive wastes (Deese 1978).

In fact, radio-

active \vaste disposal and interim storage are problems of prime con- "
cern to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) today (NRC 1978a).
Thus, high-level radioactive Haste disposal is not only a problem
of tomorrow, it is a problem today.v
It is the purpose of this paper to assess the relative environmental significance of the nuclear industries making up the
nuclear fuel cycle (Figure 1), and in particular, to review· the
state-of-the-art for high-level radioactive waste disposal.

Atten-

tion \rill be given primarily to the light-"tvater-moderated-reactors
(L\.JRs), since these are the most prevalent type of reactors in use

in the U.S. (Eichholz 1977).
The environmental effects of nuclear po\ver depend in part on
the nuclear fuel cycle adopted.

As illustrated in Figure 1, the

fuel cycle is well established for the industries from mining
through power production in the reactor.

On the other hand, the

management scheme for spent reactor fuel has not, to date, been
finally decided.

Some speculation has been given to the disposal

of spent fuel without reprocessing to recover unburned uranium and
plutonium; such a scheme is often referred to as the
option (DECO Nuclear Energy Agency 1977).

"thro\v-a~vay"

However, current plans

in the U.S. appear to favor, ultimately, the recovery of uranium
and plutonium for use as fuel, in other words, a closed nuclear
fuel cycle (Barnhart 1978).

In the mean time, it is planned to

keep spent fuel at government storage centers until further deci-
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Back End

Front End

Reactor

1

- - ..

Exploration

Mining

*~-

Federal Waste Repository

Fuel Cycle Today
Prospective Fuel Cycle Which Depends on Regulations to be Issued By Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Fig. 1.

The Light Water Reactor (LWR) nuclear fuel cycle*

*Modification of diagram of fuel cycle in David A. Deese,
Nuclear Power and Radioactive Waste, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1978)~. 2, figure 1-1.
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sions can be made (Metz 1977).

Once agreement is reached on methods

to avoid proliferation of plutonium (a nuclear bomb material), reprocessing will probably proceed and eventually a more direct reprocessing scheme may be developed that does not use government
storage centers, thereby reducing the amount of handling of wastes.
In any case, some type of fuel cycle with reprocessing

to

recover

unburned uranium and plutonium seems likely for the future and is
the management scheme given the most attention throughout the rest
of this report.
In order to gain an appreciation for the significance of radiation exposures from the various fuel cycle industries, one must
first have some appreciation for the significance of radiation exposures in general.

Table 1 lists some common sources of radiation

in the environment.

It might be noted that the radioactivity in

liquid waste from typical nuclear po~r~er plants (0.001 - 0.01 x 10-6
l.lc/ml) is lo\ver than the radioactivity, for example, in domestic tap
water.

It may further be helpful to keep in mind that the average

individual in the U.S. receives a background radiation dose of 148
mrem due to such sources as listed in Table 1 (American Nuclear
Society 1976).

One millirem (mrem) is 10- 3 rem; and a rem (radia-

tion equivalent to man) is that amount of any radiation which
causes biological damage equivalent to the biological damage caused
by absorption of 100 ergs per gram of gamma or X radiation in soft
body tissue (Eichholz 1977).
effects of radiation.

Table 2 summarizes the biological

Based on such considerations as in Table 2,
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TABLE 1
COHMON SOURCES OF RADIATION EXPOSURE

Type

Sources

Alpha

Natural radioactivity (uranium and
uranium decay products such as radium and radon) in soils, rocks and
minerals

30

Beta

Natural radioactivity (Potassiumr40) in
soils rocks, and minerals

20

Average Annual
Dose in mrem

Television (average lhour/day)
Natural radioactivity in air (tritium)
Hedical and dental X-rays
Cosmic radiation (varies with altitude)
Sea Level
Denver, Phoenix (mountains)

Gamma

0.5
2

40
40
70-90

Typical Liquid Radioactivity Levels (lo-6 ~C/ml)*
Domestic tap water
River water
4% beer
Ocean water
Whiskey

0.02
0.01-.1
0.13
0. 35
1.2

Milk
1.4
Salad oil
4.9
Typical nuclear
plant radioactive
waste discharge 0.001-0.01

SOURCE: American Nuclear Society, Q & A Nuclear Power and
the Environment, 2nd ed., (Hinsdale, Illinois: American Nuclear
Society, 1976), pp. 25, 26, 30.
*l~C

second.

= lo-6 curie; 1 curie= 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations per
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TABLE 2

BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION

Dose Level

a

(mrem)

Less than 1,000

Biological Effect
Data at low dose rates and total
doses, even in test animals, are inadequate to assess effects· at lo"Y7
levels. Therefore, effects are conservatively assumed to be directly
proportional to total dose received
regardless of dose rate (linear
hypothesis).
100 leukemia cases per million persons exposed.

1,000

9,000 (lifetime dose
from natural background radiation)
( 125 mrem/year)

Normal human life span and diseases.

Less than 25,000

Detectable only by laboratory examination. No clinically observable
effects below about 50,000 mrem.
Little or no life shortening
Few or no deaths, but acute radiation sickness and significant life
shortening.
Death of 50% of those exposed in less
than 30 days; the other 50% recover
but with some permanent impairment.
Death in less than 30 days

Less than 100,000
Less than 250,000b
450,ooob
1,000,000

b

SOURCE: American Nuclear Society, Q & A Nuclear Power and
the Environment, 2nd ed., (Hinsdale, Illinois: American Nuclear
Society, 1976), p. 34, table 7-11.
aOnce in a lifetime dose received in a short time (i.e., a
few hours or less).
bRadiation sickness includes vomiting, diarrhea, loss of
hair, nausea, hemorrhaging, fever, loss of appetite, and general
malaise. Recovery (if no complications) occurs in about three months.

7
the U.S. National Council for Radiation Protection (NCRP) has proposed recommendations for dose limits as presented in Table 3.

The

fundamental criteria for the upper limit of permissible occupational
exposure is that an employee should not accumulate more than a
~vhole-body

dose of S(N-18) rem, where N is the employee's age in

years (Eichholz 1977).

Although one may plan to limit the exposure

to 5 rem per year, this may be exceeded for various unanticipated
reasons.

The NCRP position is that no deviation from sound protec-

tion practice is implied if the retrospective whole-body dose does
not exceed 10 to 15 rem for dose increments well distributed over
time, providing the age-dependent cumulative dose limitation, S(N18), is satisfied (Eichholz 1977).
The information in Tables 1 through 3 should aid in one's
appreciation of the significance of various radiation exposures,
whether associated directly with the nuclear-fuel-cycle industries
discussed in the next chapter or other potential sources of radiation.

25 rem
100 rem, total

100 rem
200 rem, additional (300 rem, total)

0.17 rem average per year
0.17 rem average per year

0.5 rem in any one year

10-15 rem in any one year
(N-18) x 5 rem
15 rem in any one year
75 rem in any one year (25/qtr)
30 rem in any one year (10 /q tr)
15 rem in any one year (5/qtr)
0.5 rem in gestation period

5 rem in any one year

SOURCE: Geoffrey G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power, (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: Ann Arbor Science, 1977), p. 134, table 35.

Combined whole-body occupational exposure
Prospective annual limit
Retrospective annual limit
Long term accumulation to age N years
Skin
Hands
Forearms
Other organs, tissues, and organ systems
Fertile women (with respect to fetus)
Dose limits for the public or occasionally
exposed individuals
Population dose limits
Genetic
Somatic
Emergency dose limits-life saving
Individual (older than 45 years if possible)
Hands and forearms
Emergency dose limits-less urgent
Individual
Hands and forearms

DOSE-LIMITING RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSED BY NCRP, 1971

TABLE 3

CHAPTER II
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS

OF
THE FUEL CYCLE INDUSTRIES

Mining
The first step in the fuel cycle is the mining of uranium
ore.

Uranium is a common constituent of the earth's crust existing

in an average abundance of 1-2 ppm in rocks.
contain 0.05%

u3o8

(Eichholz 1977).

Hot;vever, ores must

by weight to be commercially significant
Lower grade ores may be exploited under special

conditions such as in situations where mining of gold or silver pays
for much of the cost of production.

The estimated resources of ura-

nium ore .as of 1973 could support an all nuclear U.S. energy consumption for 82 years in a no breeder reactor nuclear power program
or for 4100 years in a nuclear power program based on the breeder
reactor (American Nuclear Society 1976).
Uranium mines are hard rock mines and therefore safer than
coal mines in the sense that: (1) danger from roof falls and gas is
less, (2) the quantity of ore mined is smaller, and (3) modern
mining techniques are applied because uranium mines are relatively
new (Eichhloz 1977).

The dominant health hazard (aside from the

normal hazards inherent in any underground mine) associated with
hard rock mines is the inhalation of dust leading to the disease
silicosis, which affects the breathing ability of workers.

However,

dust problems are effectively controlled by spraying the work area
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with water and by providing adequate ventilation (Eichholz 1977).

An additional hazard, peculiar to uranium mines, may arise
from the inhalation of radon daughters associated with the emanation of radon gas from uranium bearing minerals exposed in the
mining operation.
238-

Radon itself is a product of the decay of uraniurrr

Concern with this hazard is based on studies which appear to

indicate that inhalation of radon daughters increases the risk of
lung cancer (Eichholz 1977) .
Concentration of radon daughters in mine air and hence lung
exposures depend upon air movement.
the problem is improved ventilation.

Thus the principal solution to
In working areas high venti-

lation rates are already used to control silicosis.

However, other

inactive areas and tunnels may have a build up of radon-daughter
levels while ventilation is not supplied to these areas.

Thus any

worker entering such areas may be exposed to high radon-daughter
concentrations.
Standards for exposures to radon daughter concentrations are
stated in terms of

\~orking

Level Honths (WLM).

One WLM is defined

as an inhalation of air with a concentration of one Working Level
(WL) of radon daughters for 173 working hours.

The WL is a.unit of

radon daughter concentration consisting of any combination of radon
daughters in one liter of air that will result in the ultimate emission of 1.3 x 10 5 Mev of potential alpha energy.

Standards limit

exposure to 4 \-!LM per year or 0. 3 \\TL (Eichholz 1977).

With a high

enough degree of air movement this standard can be met (Eichholz
1977).
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Milling
The second step in the fuel cycle is the milling of the mined
ore at a mill where the ore undergoes a beneficiation and purification process to extract and concentrate the uranium.

This process

involves: (1) crushing and grinding of rock to liberate ore minerals
from the surrounding rock, (2) physical separation of rock and ore
minerals by gravity or flotation methods, (3) dissolution and chemical leaching of the ore, and (4) extraction of uranium by ion exchange or solvent extraction methods (Eichholz 1977).

The concen-

trate is further refined, precipitated, dried, and shipped as
powdered sodium- or ammonium-diuranate (known as "yellow cake") which
consists of about 96%

u3o8 .

The milling process effectively separates the three longlived uranium isotopes (U-238, U-235, and U-234) from the other
decay products in the ore due to their different chemical nature.
The bulk of the radioactive uranium daughters remain in the uraniumdepleted pulp called "tailings".

These tailings consist of filter

residues and slimes, and barren leach solutions.

The tailings are

typically pumped to a tailings pond where the solids settle out and
the shorter-lived activities decay away.

The clarified liquid is

discharged to local streams after neutralization and filtering.

The

solid sediment in the pond contains most of the radium and radium
daughters (Eichholz 1977).
The liquid and solid wastes from milling contain only lowlevel concentrations of radioactive materials.

Thus, even in the
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case of an accidental release of radioactive materials, there are
no operations or activities associated with the milling process
in itself that could result in any serious radiation exposure to
either mill employees or the general

publi~

(Eichholz 1977).

Ex-

posures to an individual (from airborne effluents) is 50 mrem/yr
(to the lrmg) from the tailings pond \vhile operational and 980
rnrern/yr (to the lung) from tailings with 2 ft cover 'tvhen post operational.

Hith no controls exposures '"ould be 1, 300 mrem/yr (to the

lung) near the tailings pile but on the order of background levels
a reasonable distance a\vay.

Conversion

Milling is follotved by conversion 'tvhich is the first of
three stages of fuel preparation: conversion, uranium enrichment,
and fuel fabrication and assembly.
The conversion process envolves first the refinement of
uranium concentrate (yellmv cake) to reactor-grade purity to eliminate all gross impurities (Si, Fe, S, Th, Co, V, etc.) and to
reduce neutron-absorbing elements (such as cadmium, boron, hafnium,
and various rare earths) to acceptable trace concentrations.
refined product is then converted to uranium tetrafluoride

The

4

(L~ ,

"green salt") which is further converted to uranium hexafluoride
(UF 6 ) for enrichment.
None of the conversion processes differ significantly from
comparable processes in the chemical industry.

Thus, associated
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environmental impacts are essentially related to plant effluents
that have to be treated to remove fluorides, acids, and some trace
metallic constituents.

In fact, the main environmental concern is

related to the release of fluorides in gases and liquids (Eichholz
19 77).
The highest radiation doses from these facilities are to the
lung (30-70 mrem/yr), caused by insoluble uranium aerosols, to
individuals within 1 km of the plants.

This, it is

believed, can

be substantially reduced (Eichholz 1977).
Enrichment
The second step in fuel preparation is the enrichment of the
uranium fuel to increase the uranium-235 content.

Current light-

water-cooled reactors (LWR's) require an enriched uranium-235 content of 2-4%.

Large 1700-stage-gaseous-diffusion facilities are

employed to produce the enriched UF •
6
The energy requirements of the enrichment process are enormous.

In fact, uranium enrichment requires about 98% of the elec-

trical energy consumed in the entire fuel cycle for LWR's.
However, the model 1000 MWe nuclear

po~ver

station produces annually

about 22-25 times the energy consumed to produce an annual fuel
requirement.
Because of the enormous energy consumption, the primary environmental impact associated with the enrichment process is due
to the gaseous effluents from the coal fired stations used to gen-
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erate the required electrical energy (Eichholz 1977).

These waste

gas emissions are equivalent to the gaseous effluents released by
a 45 MWe coal fired plant.

These coal fired stations also dis-

charge large amounts of heat into the

env~ronment.

Some heat rejection to the atmosphere also occurs at the
enrichment plant and although occasional misting and fogging result
within the site due to the operation of cooling towers, the thermal
impact on the environment is insignificant (Eichholz 1977).
As far as radiation is concerned, the highest radiation dose

from an enrichment facility is expected to be less than 3 mrem/year
to the bone of the maximum exposed individual.

Less than one curie

per year of uranium is discharged (Eichholz 1977).
Fuel Fabrication
'lhe next step in the fuel cycle and the last phase of fuel
preparation is fuel fabrication and assembly.
Most nuclear reactors currently use uranium oxide fuel which
is isotropic in properties and can operate safely at high temperatures (Eichholz 1977).

The fuel may be

sjnte~ed

into rods or may

be in the form of small pellets or carbon-coated spheres..

The fuel

is clad with a thin metallic coating, typically zircaloy-4 or
stainless steel.
Three basic steps are involved in the fuel fabrication process: (1) chemical conversion of UF

to UO , (2) mechanical pro2
cessing including pellet production and fuel element fabrication,

6
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and (3) recovery of uranium from scrap and off-specification material.

The major method for UF 6 to

uo2

conversion is a wet pro-

cess using ammonium hydroxide to form an intermediate ammonium
diuranate (ADU) compound prior to final conversion to UO •
2
The most significant effluents having potential environmental impacts are chemical in nature.

Nearly all the airborne

chemical effluents result from the combustion of fossil fuels to
produce electricity for the operation of the fabrication plant.
Fluorine, in the form of fluorides, is the only significant airborne chemical effluent released by the fuel fabrication plant.
Gaseous fluorine wastes are effectively removed from air effluent
streams by water scrubbers to concentrations on the order of 20%
of the most restrictive state's standard, 0.5 mg/m3 (Eichholz 1977).
Nitrogen compounds from the use of ammonium hydroxide in U02
production and from the use of nitric acid in scrap recovery operations are the most significant chemical waste found in liquid effluents.

Depending upon the nature of the receiving stream and

downstream uses, these nitrogen releases (420 mg/1 in the form of
NH

3

plus 280 mg/1 in the form of nitrates) could constitute a

significant environmental impact (Eichholz 1977).
The highest radiation dose expected from the fabrication ,,
facility is 10 mrem/year, lung, to the maximum
living within 1 km of the plant.
uranium is discharged.

eh~osed

individual

Less than one curie per year of

V
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Nuclear Power Plants - The Reactor
The use of the fuel in the nuclear reactor forms the central
and only productive phase of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Nevertheless,

whereas mines, fabrication plants, and enrichment plants are relatively limited in number and often located in remote places, the
number of nuclear power plants is steadily growing and are typically
located near populated areas.

Therefore the literature gives a

great deal of detailed technological assessment to this portion of
the fuel cycle.

Eichholz (1977) gives a very good treatment of the

environmental aspects of nuclear power in general and of nuclear
power plants in particular.
The basic feature of nuclear energy is the fission chain
reaction in which a uranium-235 nucleus absorbs a neutron and splits
into two fission fragments, several neutrons and gamma-rays.

If at

least one of the neutrons released from each fission reaction interacts with another fissile uranium atom so as to initiate another
fission, this fission chain reaction can go on as long as fissile
fuel is available and ether conditions are satisfied to prevent excessive loss of fission initiating neutrons.

Approximately 200

Mev of energy is released per fission, mostly in the form of kinetic energy of the fission fragments and some in the form of kinetic
energy of the neutrons and in the form of photon energy.

All of .

this energy is ultimately converted to heat as these particles interact with fuel plate and moderator atoms.

This heat energy is

carried off by a coolant and used to drive a steam turbine making

17
it possible to convert some of this energy into a useful form
(electrical energy).
The variety of reactor types in existance differ primarily
in the degree of fuel enrichment and the type of moderator used.
Table 4 presents a list of reactor types and characteristics.
This report is concerned primarily with light-water moderated reactors which includes both pressurized water (PWR) and boiling
water (BWR) reactors.

However, the nuclear fuel cycle in each

case is very similar, generating similar radioactive wastes, and
differing only in the technical details of the industries involved.
It is worthy of note that most (almost 2/3's) of the energy
generated in the reactor is not converted to a useful form (electrical power) but is rejected to the environment as waste heat and
represents a potentially significant impact on the environment
(Eichholz 1977).

However, most fossil-fueled plants operate at

about 33% efficiency, and thus also reject about two thirds of the
energy produced by combustion to the environment along with massive
amounts of air pollutants

such as carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides,

oxides of nitrogen, unburned hydrocarbons, and particulates (see
for example Wark 1976).
In addition to producing heat energy of course, the fission
process produces fission fragments which are unstable and undergo
successive beta decays through nuclides at increasingly longer
half-lives until they reach a stable isobar.

As a consequence a

sizable inventory of fission products accumulates in the reactor
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fuel during burn-up, representing an enormous source of radioactivity.

Since fuel plate cladding is only a fairly thin metal sheath

around the fuel (which is subjected to thermal stresses, mechanical
forces, internal gas pressures, and corrosive action by the coolant)
almost inevitably small cracks will develop
that

~vill

in it during operation

permit a small finite fraction of the fission products to

leak into the coolant.

Due to practical and economical reasons, a

reactor is designed to continue to operate as long as not more than
0.25 to 1.0% of the fuel elements are affected.

During this time

the coolant is cycled continuously through a demineralizer column
that decontaminates the coolant by removing the dissolved trace activity by ion exchange.
Radioactivity will also occur in the coolant due to neutron
activation of corrosion and wear products of the materials composing
the coolant loop.
The exact path ways by which fission and activation products
escape from the primary coolant depend on the system design and are
radically different for PlvR's and BWR's.

In essence, radioactive

wastes escape from the reactor coolant through leaks in the steam
system, air ejectors, pump shafts and valve seals, and sampling
locations.

Other sources of radioactive wastes are the spent resin

used in the coolant purification system, laundry wastes, laboratory
drains, and floor drains.

Table 5 shows a 1972 summary of liquid

effluents from U.S. nuclear power reactors compared with the 1972
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) standards for maximum permissible
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concentrations (MPC).

The principal escape pathway for gaseous effluents from BWR's
is the steam jet air ejector.
sible pathway.

The turbine gland seal is another pos-

In PHR's gaseous wastes result from (1) reactor plant

leakages, (2) reactor coolant expansion due to heat up on start-up,
( 3) bleed-tvater required to maintain the proper boron concentration

if chemical shim is used, (4) degasification of primary coolant, and
(5) reactor plant drains.

Table 6 shows a 1972 summary of airborne

effluents from U. S . nuclear power reactors compared t..rith the 1972
NRC standards for MPC's.
Neither for the liquid effluents nor for the gaseous effluents
do concentrations exceed the NRC standards (see Tables 5 and 6).
Some other radioactive nuclides produced in a nuclear reactor,
in addition to the fission products mentioned above, are the transuranium isotopes (nuclides with atomic numbers greater than 92).
The transuraniurn elements are produced primarily by transmutation
(via neutron bombardment) of uranium and plutonium.

Although re-

sponsible for only a small portion of the radioactivity in spent
fuel, the transuranics with their decay products represent a significant portion of the radioactivity present after a few hundred years
time and are

therefo~e

important in waste management.

Table 7 is an inventory of the radionuclides to be found in
spent reactor fuel

as it would leave the power plant after 3-6

months storage on site to allow the shorter lived fission products
to decay.

Note particularly the actinides represented and the domi-

nant contributions of Ce-Pr-144, Ru-Rh-106, and Zr-Nb-95 to the
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TABLE 7

ESTIMATED SPENT-FUEL RADIONUCLIDES INVENTORY
BASIS: 40,000 MWd/MTU, 50 MW/MTU*

Half-Life
Tritium

(12 y)

Noble Gases
Kr-85
Xe-13lm

(10.4 y)
(12 d)
TOTAL

Iodine
I-129
I-131

(1.6 X 10 7 y)
(8.05 d)
TOTAL

Other Fission Products (OFP)
(50.4 d)
Sr-89
(28 y)
Sr-90
(64.2 h)
Y-90
(59 d)
Y-91
(65 d)
Zr-95
(90 h)
Nb-95m
(35 d)
Nb-95
(40 d)
Ru-103
(57 m)
Rh-103m
(1.0 y)
Ru-106
( 30. s)
Rh-106
(249 d)
Ag-llOm
(250 d)
Sn-119m
(136
d)
Sn-123m
(2. 7 y)
Sb-125
(58 d)
Te-125m
(105 d)
Te-127m
(9. 3 h)
Te-127
(33 d)
Te-129m
(67 m)
Te-129
(2 .1 y)
Cs-134
(13 d)
Cs-136
(30 y)
Cs-137
(2. 6 m)
Ba-137m
(12. 8 d)
Ba-140
(40.2 h)
La-140
(32.5 d)
Ce-141

Curies/tonne U*~
490
10,750
3
11,243
0.04
1. 73
1.77
93,210
92,010
91,040
202,500
377,400
7,549
712 '700
132,900
132,400
764,100
764,100
2,689
4,606
3,293
9,466
2,840
5,099
5,066
6,49 3
6,503
203,100
23
132,900
122 '300
400
460
83,330
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TABLE 7 - Continued

Ce-144
Pr-143
Pr-144
Nd-147
Pm-147
Pm-148
Sm-151
Eu-154
Eu-155
Tb-160

Half-Life

Curies/t'onne U

(285 d)
(13.7 d)
(17.3 in)
(11.1 d)
(2. 7 y)

1,054,000
702
1,054,000
60
165,400
198
350
10,090
6,082
124
6. 25 X 10 6

°

(5. 4 d)
(90 y)
(16 y)
(1.7 y)
(73 d)

TOTAL
Transuranium Isotopes
Np-238
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Am-241
Am-242
Cm-242
Cm-243
Cm-244

(2 .1 d)
(86 y)
(2. 4 X 10 4 y)
(6. 6 X 10 3 y)
(13 y)
(3.8 X 10 5 y)
(458 y)
(100 y)
(162 d)
(35 y)
(18 y)

TOTAL TRANSURANIUM ISOTOPES

7
4,892
338
676
175,100
4
359

7

46,310
35
5,663
2.33

X

105

SOURCE: Geoffrey G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear
Power, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Science, 1977), pp. 530-31,
table 153.
*MTU is metric ton uranium.
**One tonne (MT) equals 1000 kg.
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total activity in the fuel inventory.
Shipping
Most stages of the fuel cycle involve the movement of fairly
pure uranium compounds (prior to burning of fuel in the reactor).
Such materials are alpha-particle emitters of low specific activity
and can be shipped in drums like any other chemdcal material of
some value, subject to criticality considerations (Eichholz 1977).
On

the other hand, the spent fuel that is discharged from

the reactor at the end of its scheduled burn-up period is too radioactive to ship or process immediately and is usually placed under
many feet of water in a cooling basin.

In this cooling basin the

shorter-lived fission and activation products in the fuel are
allowed to decay and the fission product heat in the fuel elements
decreases proportionately.

After a period of 4-6 months, the spent

fuel can be shipped to a reprocessing plant (Eichholz 1977).
Because of the high level of radioactivity of the spent fuel
being shipped, the transportation step is one of major significance
in terms of total environmental impact (Eichholz 1977).

In fact,

the details of the technology and standards involved may in themselves be worthy of a research report and are beyond the scope of
this report.
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Rep recessing
Whereas

the fuel cycle industries and management up through

the power plant phase, are well established, the ultimate management
scheme regarding disposal or reprocessing of the spent fuel elements
is still in the developmental stage.
The United States nuclear policy of indefinitely deferring
commercial reprocessing and the breeder reactor program announced
on April 7, 1977, and the offer to knerican utilities and other
countries (on a limited basis) to have the Department of Energy
(DOE) take title to spent fuel for a one-time fee, announced on
October 19, 1977, have removed the immediate pressure for commercial
\vaste disposal (Deese 1978).

As a result the innnediate and over-

riding problem has become the developing of the most effective
method for spent-fuel storage (Deese 1978).

However, this only de-

lays the need for some type of ultimate disposal scheme for civilian
radioactive wastes.

In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(1978a) has accelerated efforts to resolve the problems of interim
storage of spent reactor fuel and final disposal of high-level
wastes.
fuwever, the President's policy on the use of nuclear energy
does not say that spent fuel \vill be discarded.

It does say that

there will be an indefinite delay in the reprocessing of the fuel
elements until agreement can be reached on methods to avoid proliferation of nuclear materials (Barnhart 1978).
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In any case, it appears that the current intent is ultimately
to reprocess spent fuel after a period of interim storage at government storage centers.
Of all the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing
has the highest potential risks from radioactive contamination and
release of radioactivity to the environment, and for that

reaso~

ex-

ceptional precautions and safeguards must be included in plant design
(Eichholz 1977).

Of course, the numbers of such plants would be

small.
The principle of operation of reprocessing plants is to dissolve the fuel elements, after stripping of the cladding in some
cases, and to extract successively the uranium, plutonium, and the
various fission products.

The fissile materials are to be refined

to reactor grade purity and shipped to the enrichment plant or fuel
fabrication facility for recycle.

The fission products are to be

concentrated for disposal.
The source of all radioactivity in fuel reprocessing plants
is the spent fuel shipped to the plant from a number of nuclear
power plants.
pected.

Table 7 gives an inventory of the radionuclides ex-

After fuel reprocessing, essentially all of this radioacti-

vity (less quantities that are released or decay) will reside in the
high-level liquid waste tanks at the reprocessing plant until such
time that the waste is converted to solid form and shipped to a
final disposal facility (government repository).

On site storage

times may be 20 - 100 years, to allow for decay of most of the acti-
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vation and fission products and to await decisions on the ultimate
disposal of the long-lived nuclides (Eichholz 1977).
Estimates have been made of the population exposure to radiation from radioactive material released frum the stack of a reprocessing plant and it is expected that future plants will have little,
if any, radioactivity in the liquid effluents (Eichholz 1977).

The

annual exposure to the population expected within a 50-mile radius
of the model reprocessing plant is estimated to be 167 man-rem, corresponding to 6 man-rem/annual fuel requirement.

The average annual

dose per person within the 50-mile radius is about 0.055 mrem/person
(Eichholz 1977).
Although the above radiation exposures due to reprocessing
represent a small environmental impact, the high radioactivity and
the increasing amounts of wastes (stored on site as a dewatered
slurry) are of prime environmental concern because of the

possibl~

consequences of leaks or catastrophic damage to the storage tanks
(Eichholz 1977).

Corrosion problems due to the effects of direct

radiation damage, the radiolytic decomposition of the nitric acid
solvent (which promotes oxidation of the tank walls) and the thermal stresses set up near the liquid surface must be considered in
the design of storage tanks.

Although storage for 20-100 years on

site may be necessary, permanent storage on site will rarely be
feasible or desirable and most of the long-lived activity, including
the actinides, should be shipped off-site regularly to minimize the
fission product inventory in storage.

For this reason, roost repro-

cessing plants will incorporate a solidification system to permit
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safe shipment and to reduce the need for subsequent handling
(Eichholz 1977).

Also, for the same reason, it is urgent that

ultimate disposal facilities for high-level and long-lived radioactive waste be established.
Summary of Fuel Cycle Impacts
The front end of the nuclear fuel cycle is well established
from the mining stage through the nuclear power plant.

However,

the exact management scheme for the reprocessing and the final disposal of spent fuel has not yet been established.
In reviewing the fuel cycle industries it is evident that
there are only a few critical operations that may have significant
environmental impact.

These involve the radium daughters from ura-

nium mill tailings, the power consumption entailed in enrichment
processes, the effluents (both gaseous and liquid) from reprocessing
plants, the potential impact from long-term on site storage of highlevel radioactive wastes at reprocessing plants, and the lack of a
final high-level radioactive waste disposal site.
Table 8 originally published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Comr
mission in 1974, was considered a realistic, if conservative, summary of the environmental impact that could be assigned to any representative 1000 MWe LWR through its contribution to the nuclear
fuel cycle operations (Eichholz 1977).
The topic of high-level radioactive waste disposal is a matter of current public concern and is the subject of the remainder
of this report.

First, radioactive waste will be described with
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mention of federal standards for their release and, then, the various options for high-level radioactive waste disposal will be discussed followed by consideration of general design criteria! for
geological disposal (currently the best option).
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radius. This is -::0.0057. of avcr.:1gc natural background dose to this
population.
Release from Federal \.Jaste Hepository of 0.005 Ci/yr
has been included in fission products and transuranics total.

Princii,ally from mi lb - :n.u:imum annu.11 do:-;e rate <4i~ of average
n.1tural background within ) mi. of mill.
Result!:> in 0.006 man-rem
per annual fuel requircml'nt.

From r.:ill-5 only- no signi.fic<lnt effluents to environrnent.
PrincitJally from mills- no significant effluents to environment.

:j11 -!JOJ cfs.
2

----------- -------- --·---------

H.lx1mur:\ Effl'Ct Per Annual

Estimated effluents based upon combustion of equivalent coal for power generation.

cc~-137 (0.075 Ci/AFR) and Sr-90 (0.04 Ci/AFR) are also emitted.

bl.2/. from natural gas use and process.

3

SOURCE: Geoffrey G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Science, 1977),
PP. St. 7-l..Q. table 163.

0.334

3,360

Thermal (billion Btu)

Transportation (man-rem)
Exposure of workers and general public

601

0.15
2.5

0.01

Th-2 34

Ru-106
Tritium (thousands)
Solids (buried)
Other than high-level

0.0014
0.0015

2. 1

1.01

350
0.0024
0.024

0.0)2
16. 7

75
0.02
0.02

91,000

2'·0

0.4

11. .3

Total

Ra-226
Th-2 30

Fission products and transuranics
Liqui.c..ls
Uranium and daughters

I-131

Th-2 30
Uran i urn
Tritium (thousand)
Kr-35 (thousands)
I-129

Ra-226

Effluents - Radiological (curies)
Gases (including entrainment)
Rn-222

Fe)
Tailings solutions (thousands of :-IT)
Solids

:.'H
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N

w

CHAPTER III

RADIOACTIVE l.J AS TES

Classification and Management
There are three main classifications of radioactive wastes:
lo~.,r-level

wastes, high-level wastes, and medium-or intermediate-level

wastes (Deese 1978).
The category of low-level wastes generally includes the equipment and materials contaminated at all stages of the nuclear energy
and

~..reapons

production process.

They are usually materials (slightly

contaminated) from handling and reactor coolant cleanup operations,
and generally they have radioactivity concentrations of about one
microcurie per gallon or cubic foot (Deese 1978).

These materials

consist of such things as laundry wastes, contaminated glassware and
containers, lab coats and gloves, and handling tools (Eichholz 1977).
The large volume of low-level wastes (Table 9) is often divided into
two subcategories: (1) low-level nontransuranic -.;v-as tes, or those
with less than 10 nanocuries per gram of transuranic nuclides*,

and~

(2) lmv-level transuranic wastes, or those contaminated with greater
than 10 nanocuries per gram of the very long-lived alpha emitters.
*Transuranic nuclides are members of the actinide series' of
elements (atomic numbers greater than 88) having an atomic number
greater than that of uranium (atomic number 92).

\

2'

miscell~neous

5,000,000
310

Federal repository

Plutonium (30-gallon
canisters)

2520

175,000,000

Not estim.Jted

~or 10-year-old spent fuel.

SOURCE:
David A. Deese, Nuclear Power and Radioactive tv.1ste, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington
Books, 197H), p. 3, table 1-1.

Federal repository

900,000,000

456

Federal repository

High-level wastes

Miscellaneous transurnnlum solids (i.e.,
hulJs, hardw:1r~, Pubearing solids, misc.
laboratory waste)

Negligible

400

Buried in licensed burial

Low-level miscellaneous

Fuel Reprocessing

21

Boried in licensed burial

4000

ll,OOO,OOOa

Low-level miscellaneous

620
35

7200

~egligible

Spent-Fuel Storage

Buried in licensed burial

1225
290

Buried onsite or in licensed burial facility
Federal repository

Not estimated

350

350

Rad:ioartivity
(Cur 1 cs)

Federal repository

1900

1900

2480

3900

Buried onsitc or in licenscd burial facility

Buried onsite or in licenscd burinl facility
Buried onsitc or in 1 icensed burial f3cillty

Vol uTr.c of
Waste {:-t 3 )

Lmv-level mis cellnneous
Spent fuel

Low-Jcvel C~F 2 ; misc.
P.lutonium-bcaring solids

Low-level

Low-level Ca? ; sl udgc;
2
chemic.il waste

cal w.1ste

Low-level CaF' • chcmi-

Ncthod of Dispo!>al

HASTE PRODL'CfiO~ FRm·t ~·:ODEL (1000 H.:C') FCEL CYCLE FACILITIES

Reactor Operation

Fuel F ab ri cat ion
Enriched uranium
Hixed Oxide

Enrichment
4-Caseous diffusion
2-Gas centrifuge

Enrichrnen t

Wet process

UF 6 Production
Dry process

Source

Al~NUAL

TAnLE 9
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In general, the first subcategory has been disposed of by shallow
land burial (National Research Council 1976), whereas the latter has
been reduced in volume by incineration, compaction, and immobilization--often by mixing with cement--prior to storage in steel drums
(Deese 1978).
The second category of radioactive wastes, high-level wastes,
are generated by the operation of both nuclear reactors (spent-fuel
bundles) and military (and eventually commercial) spent-fuel reprocessing facilities (high-level reprocessing wastes).

High-level

\vastes typically have radioactivity concentrations of hundreds to
thousands of curies per gallon or cubic foot.

They require heavy

shielding for handling, nearly permanent isolation (for disposal),
and long-term (about 90 to 200 years) arrangements for heat removal
or dissipation which match the thermal capacity of the isolation
system (Deese 1978).

Active cooling is required for the first 10

or 15 years when high levels of energy per cubic foot are given off.
Without some form of heat removal, the radioactive decay produces
enough heat to start high-level liquid wastes boiling (Deese 1978).
Three approximate time periods categorize the level of heat
generated by the radioactive decay of high-level radioactive wastes
(both spent-fuel and high-level reprocessing tvastes).

During the

first period, which lasts from 3 to 6 months, the heat output is
high enough to require very careful remote handling.

During this

stage wastes are maintained in interim storage facilities (at the
reactor site) to allow for the initial rapid decay of the shortlived fission products.

Although heat generation remains high,
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easier handling characterizes the second period.

This period lasts

about 600 years for high-level wastes from reprocessing, and from
thousands to tens of thousands of years for spent fuel bundles.
There is a relatively rapid drop in the

he~t

generation by fission

products in reprocessing wastes after the 200-to-600-year point, as
sho~vn

in Figure 2.

(Note, not all the uranium and plutonium can be

removed because of incomplete chemical processes.)

Spent fuel bun-

dles, however, contain large quantities of the long-lived elements
uranium and plutonium, as well as the fission products; consequently,
their heat generation remains higher for thousands of years.

The

third and final period begins when most of the fission products have
significantly decayed and heat generation is no longer a problem.
This stage includes most of the life of high-level waste from reprocessing (Figure 2) and the later stages of decay of spent fuel
bundles.

The major differences in the lengths of the second and

third time periods for the two types of high-level wastes have an
important implication for final disposal:

the period of high heat

generation for spent fuel bundles will extend well beyond the several hundreds of years that specially designed, man-made structures
might be expected to endure (Deese 1978).
The third main classification of radioactive wastes, mediumor intermediate-level wastes, includes the enormous range of materials which falls between low-level transuranic waste and the highlevel waste in activity level.

Intermediate-level wastes may be

from some of the same sources as low-level wastes and in addition
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Fig. 2. Heat generated by the radioactivity in one waste
canister of high-level waste. Such a waste canister (300 em long
and 30 em in diameter) contains the waste from 100 }Myr, so a typical large power plant would produce 10 canisters of waste per
year. Lighter curves are contributions from individual isotopes,
and the heavier curve is the sum of these contributions.
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "High-Level Radioactive Waste
from Light-Water Reactors," Reviews of Modern Physics 49 (January
1977): 1-19.
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can include cladding hulls and other transuranium solids.

(Both

loH-level and intermediate-level transuranic wastes are sometimes
called alpha wastes 'tvhich have the connnon characteristic of a concentration level of alpha emitters which requires special management
procedures.)

Although the radiation levels of intermediate-level

materials necessitate remote handling or shielding, their heat generation levels are relatively low, and the overall volume produced
is small compared with lo'tv-level wastes.

Medimn-level wastes, which

are stored in solid form, 'tvill probably require disposal precautions
similar to those taken for high-level wastes (Deese 1978).
It is 'tvorthy of note that the above classifications tend to
lead to the false assumption that the real waste management problem
is only the extremely radioactively hot, highly toxic, and penetrating high-level \-.Tastes, containing most of the fission products;
where in fact, the management (especially disposal) of even low-level
\vastes (about 90 percent of the total waste volume) has become
increasingly troublesome (Deese 1978).

Their long-lived alpha

components are now considered unsuitable for the traditional disposal method of burial in 20-ft-deep covered trenches (Deese 1978).
Serious consideration is now being given to the requirement that all
alpha-contaminated wastes be as permanently isolated as high-level
materials' (Deese 1978).
Table 9 presents the annual waste production expected from
model (per 1000 MWe produced by the reactor) fuel cycle facilities
along with the 1977 NRC scheme for disposal.

The federal repository,

indicated (Table 9) as the final disposal method for those wastes
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requiring almost permanent isolation, does not yet exist.

In fact,

the lack of a final disposal site for such wastes is currently a
matter of prime concern to the NRC (1978a) and the public and is
the motivation for the remaining chapters of this research report.
Inventory and Standards
Table 10 is a list of the more significant nuclides in radioactive waste management, showing the half-life, the major mode of
decay, and the major generation mechanisms for each.

Based on decay

modes, \vastes are often referred to as alpha (a.) wastes, beta (S)
emitters, or gamma (y) wastes.

Note particularly the long half lives

of many of these radionuclides ranging upwards to in excess of millions of years, most fission products having relatively short half
lives and most actinides having relatively long half lives.

Table

11 shows estimates of the projected high-level and alpha wastes that
would have to be handled by federal repositories in the near future.
The most significant radionuclides of Tables 10 and 11 are discussed
further below (after Gilmore 1977).
Carbon-14, Cobalt-60, Radium-226
As shown in Table 10 carbon-14 and cobalt-60 are produced by

neutron capture, whereas

radiu~226

is the decay daughter of thorium-

230.
Radiu~226 is one of the most hazardous materials known (Gil-

more 1977).

Radium-226 replaces calcium in the bone structure and

is a source of irradiation to the blood-forming organs.

This, along
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TABLE 10
SIGNIFICANT NUCLIDES IN RADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT

Nuclide

Half-life

Tritium
Carbon-14
Argon-41
Iron-55
Cobalt-58
Cobalt-60
Nickel-63
Krypton-85
Strontium-89
Strontium-90
Yttrium-91
Zirconium-93
Zirconium-95
Niobium-95

12.3 y
5. 7 X 10 3y
1.8 h
2.9 y
72 d
5. 3 y
120 y
10.8 y
51 d
28 y
59 d
6
1.5 X 10 y
65 d
35 d

Technetium-99
Ruthenium-106
Iodine-129
Iodine-131
Xenon-133
Cesium-134
Cesium-135
Cesi um-137
Cerium-141
Ceriurn-144
Promethium-147
Samarium-151
Europium-154
Lead-210
Radon-222
Radium-226
Thorium-229
Thorium-230
Uranium-234

2.1

Uranium-235

(3

s
sa
ECb
sa
sa
s
~
s
s
s
s
sa
sa

5

X

10 y

X

10 y

1 y

1.7

Haj. mode
of decay

7

8 d

5.2 d
2.1 y 6
2 X 10 y
30 y
33 d
285 d
2.6 y
93 y
16 y
22 y
3.8 d
3
1.6 X 10 y
3
7.3 X
y
8 x 10 y
5
2.4 X lQ y

!0

7.1

X

10 8y

a
a
a

aa
a
CJ.

Major generation
mechanisms
Fission and neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission and neutron capture
Fission and daughter of
Zirconium-95
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission and neutron capture
Fission
Fission
Fission
Fission
"Fission
Fission
Fission and neutron capture
Daughter of Polonium-214
Daughter of Radium-226
Daughter of Thorium-230
Daughter of Uranium-233
Daughter of Uranium-234
Daughter of Protactinium-

234
Natural source, daughter
of Plutonium-239
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TABLE 10 - Continued

Nuclide

Half-life

Maj. mode

of decay
10 9y
10 6y

Uranium-238
Neptunium-237

4.5
2.1

Plutonium-238

87 y

a

Plutonium-239
Plutonium-240
Plutonium-241
Plutonium-242
Americium-241

2.4 X 10 4y
6.6 X 10 3y
15 y
5
3.87 X 10 y
433 y

a
a
B
a
a

Americium-243
Curiurn-242
Curium-244

7.37 X 10 3y
163 d
18 y

a
a
a

X

X

a
Ct

Major generation
mechanisms
Natural source
Neutron capture and daughter of Americium-241
Neutron capture and daughter of Curiumr242
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture and daughter of Plutonium-241
Neutron capture
Neutron capture
Neutron capture

SOURCE: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Objectives, Concepts
and Strategies for the Hanagement of Radioactive Waste Arising from
Nuclear Power Programmes, (Paris, France: Nuclear Energy Agency,
1977), p. 29, table II.
a)\.Jith associated penetrating gamma radiation.
b)EC=orbital electron capture.

Solidified high level wastea
Annual volume, 103 ft3
Accumulated volume, 103 ft 3
Total accumulated activity, MCi
Total thermal power, MW
Significant isotopes accumulated
28.9-y Sr-90, MCi
30-y Cs-137, MCi
1.6 X 107-y, I-129, Ci
10.8-y Kr-85, MCi
12. 3-y H-3, MCi
87. 4-y Pu-238 ,h MCi
24,400-y Pu-239,h MCi
6600-y Pu-240,b MCi
14.3-y Pu-241,b MCi
433-y Am-241, MCi
18.1-y Cm-244, MCi
Number of shipments to repositories c

Fuel reprocessed, metric tons/yr

Installed nuclear electric capacity, MW

960
1,300
480
120
7.3
1.2
0.022
0.041
6.6
2.3
30
23

9.7
44
19,000
80

3,000

150,000

1980

5 '700
8,000
3, 300
690
44
10
0.3
0.5
58
28
170
240

33
290
110,000
410

9,000

450,000

1990

Calendar Year Ending

PROJECTED HIGH-LEVEL AND ALPHA-EMITTING WASTES

TABLE 11

12,000
20,000
9,700
1,500
110
40
1.7
2.4
240
150
330
590

58
770
270,000
1,040

19,000

940,000

2000

N

~

0.51
0.11
0.16
30
0.14
930

0.36
4.6
31
0.003

8.4
2.0

2.6
0.58
0.83
146
1.0
1,200

400
6.6
3,030

2.8

2.5
27.0
420
0.66

2000

0.92
10.4
150
0.17

1990

Calendar Year Ending

dEach shipment contains 832 ft3 of waste.

cEach shipment consists of 57.6 ft 3 of waste in thirty-six 6-in.-diameter cylinders.
the waste is aged 5 years and half is aged 10 years at the time of its shipment.

bAssumes 0.5% of plutonium in fuel is lost to waste.

aAssumes 1 ft 3 of solidified waste per 10,000 MWd (th).

Half of

SOURCE: Geoffrey G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann
Arbor Science, 1977), p. 558, table 165.

Alpha wastes
Annual volume, 106 ft 3
Accumulated volume, 10 6 ft3
Total activity, MCi
Total thermal power, MW
Significant isotopes accumulated, MCi
87. 4-y Pu-2 38
24,400-y Pu-239
6600-y Pu-240
14. 3-y Pu-241
433-y Am-241
Number of shipments to repositoriesd

1980

TABLE 11 - Continued
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with its long half-life and high radiation energies, places it in
the highest radiotoxicity group.

Carbon-14 and cobalt-60, on the

other hand, are moderately dangerous radioactive materials.
Two sets of standards have been established for the permissible radiation exposure in unrestricted areas.

One is for the

greatest dose received by an individual and the other for the average dose received by the general population.

The standards for the

safe release of these materials to the environment in an unrestricted
area are contained in 10CFR20 and their release should not result in
concentrations in air and water greater than those listed in Table
12.

These concentrations apply to an individual and are limited to

one-third the concentrations in air or water specified in the case
of the general population.
Although rarely practiced, the disposal by release in a sanitary sewage system is limited to 0.1 microcurie of radium-226, 10
rnicrocuries of cobalt-60, and 1,000 microcuries of carbon-14.

The

disposal by burial at any one location and time is limited to 100
times the above amounts (10CFR20).
Carbon-14, cobalt-60, and

radiu~226

are candidates for a

National Disposal Site or Repository due to the large commercial
usage of these chemicals and the high health hazard of these particular radionuclides.

The recommended process for the disposal of

carbon-14 and cobalt-60 wastes in small concentrations is by land
burial (Gilmore 1977).

The recommended disposal method for radi~

226 and large concentrations of carbon-14 and cobalt-60 is disposal
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TABLE 12
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE CONCENTRATIONS
(INDIVIDUAL, 1JNRESTRICTED AREAS)

Concentration in
Air (pc/ml)

Radionuclide

Tritium

s
I

Sub
Carbon-14

s
Sub

Cobalt-60

s
I

2

X

10- 7

2 X 10=~
4 X lQ
1
1

X

10- 7
10- 6

X

10- 8

X

Concentrations in
Water (iJc/ml)

:1
3

X

10- 10

X

10- 7

....
5
3

X

X

10=~

10

Krypton-85

Sub

3

St ron ti um-90

s

3 x lo- 11
2 X 10-lO

3 x 1o-7
4 X 10- 5
6

X

I

4 X 10- 9
1 X 10-9

6

X

s

2 X 10- 8

1

X

I

3

1

X

s

3

I

Zi rconi um-95

Niobium-95

Rutheni um-106

s

I

Iodine-129

s
I

X

10- 9

1 X 10=~
1 X 10

2 x lo- 11
2 x lo-9

6

X

10-S

2

X

10- 4

I

Xenon-133

Sub

3

X

10- 7

Cesium-134

s

1

X

10-9

I

4

X

10- 10

s

3

X

10-lQ

Cerium-144

s

I

-4

10_
4
10

10- 9
2 x lo- 10
X

1 X lQ-lQ
1 X 10- 8

Iodine-131

10- 5
10-5

2 x 1o- 10

3 x 10- 7

5

6

X

10-

9
4

X

10 -S
10

1
1

X

-6

X

X

10-5
10- 5
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TABLE 12 - Continued

Radionuclide

Promethium-14 7
Plutoniun-238
P1utonium-239

Form1

Concentration in
( 1Jc/ml)

s

2 X 10- 9

I

3

X

10_g

2 X 10- 4
4
2 X 10-

s

7

1

10-14
10-l2

5
3

X

I

X
X

s

6
1

X

10 -14
_
10 12

5
3

X
X

10- 6
10- 5

5
3

X
X

-6
10_
10 5

2 x lo- 4
1 X 10- 3

I
Plutonium-240

s
I

P 1 u toni llil1-2 41

s
I

Americi'l..Un-241

s
I

Arnericium-243

s
I

Curium-242

s
I

Curium-244

s

X

6
1

X
X

10- 14
1o-12

3
1

X
X

lo-12
10-9

X

10-6
10- 5

2 x lo-13
4 X lo-12

4
2

X
X

10- 6
10- 5

2 x lo- 13
4 X lo-12

4
3

X

10- 6
10- 5

4 X 10-:12
6 X 1o-12

2 x 10-s
3 X lo-5

3
3

I

SOURCE:

Concentrations in
(1Jc/ml)

X
X

lo-13
10-12

X

7

X

3

X

10- 6
10- 5

Atomic Energy, 10 C.F.R. (1977): pp. 162-169, table II.

1so1uble (S), Insoluble (I), "Sub" means that values given are
for submersion in a semispherica1 infinite cloud of airborne material.
NOTE: If radionuclides A, B, and C are present in concentrations CA, ~, and C , and if the applicable MPC's are }fPCA, HPC:s and
MPCC respec¥ively, fhen the concentrations shall be limited so that
the follrn~ing relationship exists:
CA
CB
Cc
HPC + MPC + MPC :5.. l
A

B

C
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in a federal repository, probably salt beds, (Gilmore 1977).
Cesium-134 and

Cesiu~l37

Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 are radio3ctive isotopes (Table 10)
produced by the fission of uranium and plutonium and will exist in
combination with other radionuclides in high-level and low-level radioactive wastes.

Cesiumrl34 and cesiumr137 have high fission

yields of 8 percent and 6 percent respectively.
Cesium-137, because of its long half-life and high fission
yield, is one of the most important fission products produced in
nuclear reactors, from the

vi6~oint

of waste management.

fission product of comparable importance is strontium-90.

The only
The im-

portance of cesium-137 is realized by the fact that it accounts for
10% of the total fission product activity in nuclear reactor wastes
after one year, and for 52% after ten years (Gilmore 1977).
Cesium-134 is also of significance due to its high fission
yield (8 percent) and high specific power (20 watts/gram).
Although produced in nuclear power reactors, the primary
source of cesium-134 and cesium-137 (in a closed fuel cycle) is in
the high-level, aqueous waste streams generated at the spent fuel
reprocessing plants.

Cesiumrl34 and cesium-137 can be recovered

from the high-level waste streams from nuclear waste reprocessing
for separate disposal or reuse (Gilmore 1977).

The acceptable

method of treatment is solidification, followed by storage in a
near-surface engineered storage facility and ultimate disposal in a
federal repository.

Cesium should also be recovered from the low-
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level waste streams to minimize the amount directly released to the
environment.

This recovered cesium should be solidified and dis-

posed of at approved sites by land burial (Gilmore 1977).
The release of these materials to the environment should not
result in concentrations in air and water greater than those listed
in Table 12.

These concentrations apply to an individual and are

limited to one-third the concentrations in air or water specified
for the case of the general population.
The disposal of cesium-134 by release into a sanitary sewage
system is limited to 100 microcuries and the disposal of cesium-137
is limited to 100 microcuries.

The disposal by burial in the soil

at any one location and time is limited to 1,000 microcuries of
cesium-134 and 10,000 microcuries of cesium-137.
Cesium-134 and Cesium-137 are candidates for a federal repository due to their public health hazard and projected grotv-th with
that of the civilian nuclear power program.
Hydrogen-3
Tritium, an isotope of hydrogen, is produced in nuclear reactors in substantial quantities.

It is currently released to the

environment in the form of tritiated coolant water from the reactor
and tritium wastes resulting from processing of the spent nuclear
fuels (in a closed fuel cycle).

In the reactor power plant waste

disposal systems, water (from coolant pump leakage and refueling
operations) undergoes several treatment processes before being released to the environment, but none of these processes is effective
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in removing tritium (Gilmore 1977).

Tritium may compose between SO

and almost 100 percent of the total amount of radioactive material
discharged as liquid 'tvaste (Table 5) from nuclear reactors (Gilmore
1977).

The amount of tritium discharged from reactors in a gaseous

form is only about 1 percent of the total tritium discharged.
Fission-product tritium is generally contained by the cladding
surrounding each fuel element.

This fission-product tritium is re-

leased \vhen spent fuel is processed and appears as tritiated water
in the fuel processing plant evaporator condensates.

This repre-

sents the greatest source of tritium release to the environment, in
a closed fuel cycle (Gilmore 1977).
Although it is one of the least hazardous radioactive nuclides, the recovery and retention of tritium may be required in the
future due to its long half-life for radioactive decay, the rapid
rate of expansion of nuclear potver (and fuel-reprocessing in a
closed fuel cycle), and its ability to be metabolized in the form of
tritiated water and incorporated into body fluids and tissues.

Tri-

tium is therefore a candidate for a federal repository.
Table 12 lists the maximum permissible radiation exposure (as
~c/ml)

in unrestricted areas for an individual.

The limit for the

general population is one-third of the concentrations listed for
tritium.
Although rarely practiced, the disposal by release in a sanitary sewage system is limited to 10,000 microcuries.

The disposal

by burial at any one location and time is limited to 100 times the
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above amount.
Iodine-129, Iodine-131, Kryton-85 and Xenon-133
Iodine and the noble gases, Kryton and Xenon, are produced
during the fission of uranium in nuclear reactors.

They represent

a potential source of environmental contamination since in a closed
fuel cycle they are released to the environment during reprocessing
of the nuclear fuels (Gilmore 1977).
Of the fission-product halogens, only the isotopes l-129 and
I-131 are physiologically significant after 30 days of post irradiation decay (Gilmore 1977).

The iodine-131 contents of reactor fuels

are approximately 72,000 and 2 curies per metric ton of reactor fuel
after decay times of 30 and 150 days respectively.

The iodine-129

content is only about 0.03 curie per metric ton of reactor fuel.
Even though the iodine-129 content in reactor wastes is low, it is
significant since it has a half-life of 17 million years compared
to the iodine-131 half-life of 8 days.

Concern with iodine-129 and

iodine-131 arises from the fact that these radionuclides are concentrated by biological processes in the food chain leading to man.
This concentration occurs in the grass-cow-milk pathway to the thyroids of man (Gilmore 1977).
Krypton and xenon are both produced in significant quantities
in nuclear reactors.

These isotopes are chemically inert and, once

released, they do not concentrate in body tissues.

Of various iso-

topes of krypton and xenon in reactor fuels, the only two isotopes
of significance are krypton-85 and xenon-133.

Kryton-85 has a half-
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life of 10.8 years, a moderate beta radiation energy, a low gamma
radiation level, and a fission yield of 1.3 percent.

Xenon-133 has

a half-life of 5.3 days, a moderate beta and gamma radiation energy,
and a fission yield of 6.6 percent.
The standards for safe release of these materials to the
environment in an unrestricted area are contained in 10CFR20 and
their release should not cause the concentrations in air and water
to exceed the concentrations listed in Table 12.

These concentra-

tions apply to an individual and the exposure of the general population is limited to one-third of these values.
Although rarely practiced, the disposal by release in a sanitary sewage system is limited to 1 uacrocurie for iodine-129, 10
microcuries for iodine-131, and 1000 microcuries for krypton-85
and xenon-133.

The disposal by burial at any one location and time

is limited to 100 times the above amounts (10CFR20).
Although the release rates at present (rndlitary) reprocessing
plants are low, the recovery and retention of iodine and the noble
gases may be required in the near future due to the rapid rate of
expansion of the nuclear po\ver industry (and the corresponding expansion in the nuclear fuel reprocessing industry in the case of a
closed fuel cycle).
Iodine-131 and xenon-133 can be stored in engineered storage
facilities to allow their radioactive decay and then disposed of in
low concentrations in land burial facilities.

Iodine-129 and xenon-

133 should be stored in engineered storage facilities followed by
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disposal in a federal repository, probably salt beds (Gilmore 1977).
Iodine-129 and krypton-85 are candidates for a federal repository due to their long half-lives and projected growth with that
of the civilian nuclear power program.

Iodine-131 and xenon-133 are

not candidates for a Federal repository site because of their short
half-lives (Gilmore 1977).
Plutonium-238, Plutonium-239, Plutoniurnr240,
Plutonium-241, Americiurnr241, Americium-243,
Curiurnr242, and Curium-244
Plutonium, americium, and curium are artificially produced
radionuclides that do not exist in nature except for very small
amounts of plutonium.

These elements are characterized by their

high radiotoxicity, long half-life, and ability to fission.
Plutonium-239 is the most important among these elements because of its use in nuclear weapons and the place it holds as the
key material in the development of fast-breeder · reactors for the
civilian nuclear power program (Gilmore 1977).

Plutonium-239 is

readily fissionable with neutrons, and one pound of this material is
equivalent to about ten billion watt hours of heat energy (Gilmore
1977).
Americium, curium, and plutonium (except for Pu-241) decay by
the emission of high energy, 5 to 6 Mev, alpha particles.
241 decays by beta emission to form americium-241.

Plutonium-

All these ele-

ments eventually decay to lead, and the time required is on the order
of millions of years (Gilmore 1977).
The majority of the transuranium elements are produced in nu-
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clear reactors and are contained within the spent fuel elements.
Plutonium, americium, and curium are hazardous, long-lived isotopes
for

\o~hich

extreme precautions are required in their disposal.

Plu-

tonium is separated from the spent fuel processing \vastes (in a
closed fuel cycle) by solvent extraction for reuse.
tors as high as 99.8 percent can be obtained.

Recovery fac-

The americium, curium,

and remaining p lutoni UJ.""TI are (in a closed fuel cycle) contained with
the final reprocessing 'tvastes.

The acceptable methods of treatment

are spray or phosphate glass solidification and disposal in either
salt deposits or near-surface engineered facilities (Gilmore 1977).
Plutonium, americium, and curium wastes from research laboratories
and other sources should also be solidified, encapsulated, and disposed of in the same manner (Gilmore 1977).
The standards for the safe release of these materials to the
environment in an unrestricted area are contained in 10CFR20 and
their concentrations in air and water should not exceed the values
given in Table 12.

These concentrations apply to an individual.

Exposure of the general population (i.e. a suitable sample thereof)
should not exceed one-third of the concentrations in air or water

given.
Although not practiced, the disposal by release in a sanitary
se~vage

system is limited to 0.1 microcurie.

The disposal by burial

at any one location and time is limited to 10 microcuries (10CFR20).
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Plutonium, americium, and curium are candidates for a federal
repository (disposal site) due to their long half-lives, health
hazard, and projected growth with that of the civilian nuclear
potver program.
Ruthenium-106, Cerium-144, and Promethiurnr147
Ruthenium-106, cerium-144, and promethium-147 are radioactive
isotopes that are produced in nuclear reactors by the fission of
uranium.

These three isotopes have moderately long half-lives

(Table 10) and account for a majority of the total fission product
activity and heat content in the spent fuel processing.

After one

year of radioactive decay, they are responsible for 65 percent of
the total heat content and for 70 percent of the total activity in
the high-level waste.

Since these isotopes are principally produced

in nuclear reactors, their projected grow·th w·ill parallel that of
the civilian nuclear program.
Since all three radionuclides are hazardous to man by inhalation, ingestion, or direct radiation

eh~osure,

care must be exercised

in their handling and disposal.
For an individual, the safe release of these materials to the
environment in an unrestricted area should not exceed the concentrations listed in Table 12.

The concentrations for the safe release

of these materials, in the case of exposure of the general population, are limited to one-third the concentrations listed.
The disposal by release into a sanitary sewage system is
limited to 10 microcuries for Ru-106 and Ce-144 and to 100 micro-
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curies for Pm-147.

The disposal by burial in the soil at any one

location and time is limited to 1,000 microcuries for Ru-106 and Ce144 and to 10,000 microcuries for Pm-147.
Due to their relatively high activiLy and their moderately
long half-lives, ruthenium-106, cerium-144, and promethium-147 are
candidates for a Federal repository disposal site.

Thus, the recom-

mended treatment for the high-level wastes is solidification by
either spray or phosphate glass solidification processes, interim
storage in near-surface engineered facilities, and ultimate disposal
in geological (probably salt) formations (Gilmore 1977).
Strontium-90 (Yttriurnr90)
Strontiurn-90 is a radioactive isotope principally produced by
the fission of uranium and plutonium.
and emits a 0.546 1-fev beta particle.

It has a half-life of 28 years
Strontium-90 produces a short

half-lived daughter, yttrium-90, which has a half-life of 64 hours
and emits a 2.27 }1ev beta particle.

Yttrium-90, in turn, produces

zirconium-90 '\vhich is a stable element.

In the wastes

generated

at nuclear power plants, strontiurnr90 and its daughter (yttrium-90)
are responsible for approximately 7 percent and 38 percent of the
total fission product activity in the wastes after 1 year and 10
years, respectively (Gilmore 1977).
Strontium-90 has attracted great interest as a public health
hazard since it is the most biologically significant of the radioactive fission products produced in either nuclear weapon tests or
nuclear reactors (Gilmore 1977).

Its biological significance is
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derived from several factors: (1) it has a large fission yield (5. 9%),
(2) it has a long effective half-life, and (.3) it tends to deposit
and concentrate in the bone tissue (due to the fact that strontium
is chemically similar to calcium).
Since strontium-90 is hazardous to man by inhalation, ingestion, or direct radiation exposure, care must be exercised in its
handling and disposal.
The standards for the safe release of strontium-90 to the
environment in an unrestricted area are contained in 10CFR20 and
their release should not result in concentrations in air and water
greater than those listed in Table 12.

These concentrations apply

to an individual and the exposure of the general population is
limited to one-third of these values.
Although rarely utilized, the disposal of strontium-90 by
release into a sanitary sewage system is limited to 1 microcurie or
a concentration of 1 x 10-5 microcurie per ~lliliter of water in

the soluble form or 1 x 10- 3 microcuries per milliliter of water in
the insoluble form.

The disposal of strontiumr90 by burial in the

soil at any one location and time is limited to 100 roicrocuries of
strontiu~90

(Gilmore 1977).

The recommended treatment for strontium-90 in low-level waste
streams is recovery by scavenging-precipitation ion exchange follolved
by solidification with asphalt and disposal by land burial.

For the

high-level strontium-90 wastes the recommended processes are recovery
followed by either spray or phosphate glass solidification, interim
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storage of the solid waste in near-surface engineered storage facilities, and disposal in geological (probably salt) formations
(Gilmore 1977).
(dispa~

Strontium-90 is a candidate for a Federal repository

sal site) due to it's health hazard and its projected growth with
that of the civilian nuclear power program (Gilmore 1977).
Zirconiumr95 and Niobium-95
Zirconium-95 is a radioactive isotope principally produced in
nuclear reactors by the fission of uranium and plutonium.

Zircon-

ium-95 has a half-life of 65 days and emits both beta particles and
gamma rays.

Zirconium-95 produces, by beta decay, niobiumr95 (some

niobium-95 is a direct product of fission).

Niobium-95 has a half-

life of 35 days, emits a 0.160 Mev beta particle and a 0.765 Mev
gamma ray.

Niobium-95 is transformed by beta decay into molybdenumr

95 which is stable.
Zirconiu~95

and niobium-95 account for 25 percent of the

total activity in spent fuel processing wastes (military) after 90
days.

Their activity decreases by a factor of 1,000 within 2 years.

Considerable difficulty exists in the separation of uranium and plutonium from these elements since they (Zr-95 and Nb-95) both form
radioactive colloids in solution.

They also tend to be absorbed on

surfaces such as container walls.

Since zirconium-95 and niobiumr95

have short half-lives and since they are of lindted commercial use,
their recovery is not required and they will probably be contained
with the long-lived fuel reprocessing wastes (Gilmore 1977).

Thus,
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the acceptable method of treatment is solidification followed by
storage in near-surface engineered facilities and disposal in geological (probably salt) formations (Gilmore 1977).
The release of these nuclides to the environment should not
cause the concentrations in air and water to exceed those listed in
Table 12 for an individual or one-third of those listed for the
general population.
Although rarely practiced, the disposal of

zirconi~95

and

niobium-95 into a sanitary sewage system is limited to 100 microcuries.

Their disposal by burial in the soil at any one location

and time is limited to 10,000 microcuries.

As components contained in high-level reprocessing wastes
(and since their growth is expected to parallel that of the civilian
nuclear power program), zirconiumr95 and niobium-95 are both candidates for disposal in a Federal repository.
Summary of Radioactive Waste Management
Radioactive wastes are classified as low-level, intermediatelevel, and high-level wastes.

The low-level transuranic wastes (be-

cause of their huge volume and long-half lives) and the high-level
wastes (due to their high toxicity and long-lived components) require
almost permanent isolation from man.

The radioactive waste disposal

problem will be increasingly troublesome as the inventories of radioactive wastes grow (Table 11) with the civilian nuclear power program.
The deferment of fuel reprocessing by order of the President
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of the U.S. has: (1) delayed indefinitely the implementation of the
civilian fast breeder reactor program, and (2) increased the immediate needs for interim storage facilities (NCR 1978a).

This leads

to some speculation on the possiblity of a "throw-away" radioactive
waste management scheme.
In the "thro'l;.,r-away" scheme no spent fuel is reprocessed.
Thus, almost all .the radioactivity would remain concentrated in one
main \vaste stream, consisting of the spent fuel itself and containing
practically all the fission products and actinides generated together \vith the unbumt uranium.

Although the details have not been

established, a likely minimum treatment consists of encapsulation of
fuel assemblies into canisters or dismantling fuel assemblies,
breaking the elements into smaller pieces, and conditioning these
pieces in such a T.vay as to provide for both heat exchange and containment of the radionuclides.
pensive operation.

This '\vould not be a simple and inex-

Transportation and disposal requirements for

spent fuels would be comparable to the requirements for alpha and
high-level waste in the reprocessing scheme; isolation from the biosphere is the only obvious solution for disposal (OECD NEA* 1977).
Indications are that the U.S. will adopt the reprocessing
(closed fuel cycle) scheme, once agreement can be reached on methods
to avoid proliferation (Barnhart 1978).
In any case,

regardless

of the fuel cycle scheme adopted, the

*OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency, where OECD stands for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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need for permanent isolation of some form for high-level and other
long-lived wastes is evident.

CHAPTER IV

HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL ALTERNATIVES
As the civilian nuclear power program grows, the need to

es~

tablish a safe scheme for the ultimate disposal of high-level and
other long-lived radioactive wastes becomes increasingly urgent.
Alternatives that have been (and/or are being) considered include:
(1) partition and recycle, (2) partition and transmute, (3) space
disposal, (4) disposal in an ice sheet, (5) retrievable engineered
storage, (6) disposal in deep geological formations on land, and
(7) ocean disposal.

It is the purpose of this chapter to re- ·

view the current state-of-the-art of these alternatives.
Partition and Recycle
Partitioning the wastes into different fractions and recycling certain elements to allow for use as sources for heat·, use for
irradiating sewage, and other uses, present some interesting possibilities, but these uses provide for only a small portion of the
wastes, and only on a temporary basis (Deese 1978).
Partition and Transmute
Nuclear transmutation, which already takes place in the case
of plutonium recycle (military), involves the conversion of longlived nuclides into much shorter lived or even stable nuclides.
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The transmutation of long-lived fission products is not considered feasible within the scope of current or near-term technology,
although the transmutation of the actinides could offer some promise (OECD NEA 1977).

An additional benefit in the case of the ac-

tinides could be the increase in fissile resources that would result.

However, the success of this scheme will be critically depen-

dent on the development of new processes to achieve adequate levels
of separation of the actinides from the multiplicity of wastes in
which they appear; and on the development of a fuel capable of withstanding the extremely high level of irradiation necessary to minimize multiple handling and recycling which leads .to further waste
production (OECD NEA 1977).
Since actinides cannot be destroyed completely and since some
fraction will always remain in wastes as a consequence of the finite
separation factors achievable, some increased handling and processing
will result.

The increased handling and processing will give rise

to other contaminated wastes of different forms.

Thus, a detailed

analysis of the risk of the whole concept (which includes the disposal of the residual actinide wastes and the various partitioning
and recycling operations) will have to be performed to determine if
it is worth pursuing (OECD NEA 1977).

In this

case the concept

must offer a significant reduction in risk compared to more conventional geological disposal alternatives to be worthwhile.
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Space Disposal
Disposal of radioactive wastes in space (either in the sun
or in deep space) would provide the most complete isolation of these
wastes from man's environment.
The concept appears practical only for small volumes and
therefore_would imply separation of that fraction of the waste considered most hazardous from the rest of the waste (OECD NEA 1977).
This separation implies additional processing of the waste which in
itself involves some risks.

Other issues of concern include launch

safety and the consequences of waste capsules re-entering the atmosphere; a very high launch reliability would be essential.
Although the technology is available in the U.S., the economic viability is doubtful (OECD NEA 1977).
Disposal in an Ice Sheet
A typical example of schemes for-disposal of radioactive
wastes in an ice sheet involves the waste containers melting
through the ice to the ice-rock interface and being sealed off by
the refreezing of the ice behind them.

Reliability of containment

could be further enhanced by the emplacement of the waste in the
frozen bedrock underlying the ice sheet.

This would have the advan-

tage of removing the waste from the ice sheet which in a geological
sense, is a potentially mobile structure (OECD NEA 1977).
Antarctica would be a prime candidate for these concepts because it has the advantages of

a large surface area, a huge ice cap,
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no inhabitants, a hostile environment (thus being unlikely to be extensively used by man in the future), and 5 or 6 million years (at
least) of continual glaciation (OECD NEA 1977).
However, there is limited understanding of the geophysics of
large ice caps and the mechanisms controlling the long-term climate
on earth.

And, though technically feasible, a major investigation

of the geological and hydrological aspects involved would be required
before such a scheme could be implemented.

Also, changes in inter-

national and political arrangements concerning Antarctica would be
needed (OECD NEA 1977).
Retrievable Engineered Surface Storage
Retrievable engineered storage (surface storage) is technically feasible ·and will be required in some form for commercial
spent fuel during the 1970's and into the 1990's, but is widely rejected as a final disposal option on social, economic, environmental, political, and institutional grounds (Willrich 1977).
Disposal in Deep Geological Formations on Land

j

Disposal in deep geological formations (both on land and in
the

seabe~utilizes

the concept of a multiple barrier system.

multiple barrier system consists of

The

first, man-made barriers (the

form of the waste and the container) and next, natural barriers (the
surrounding geological media).

Over the long term, the system will

succeed only if the geological media (salt, rock, or clay on land,
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and clay sediments in the seabed) can isolate all the radionuclides
for the required time periods (Deese 1978).

Geological formations

\vhich have been considered for disposal of long-lived wastes can be
categorized into three groups.

Most attenlion has been directed to

disposal into salt although more recently argillaceous (clay) and
hard rock formations have also been considered (OECD NEA 1977).
Disposal in Salt Formations
Disposal in salt formations is the most promising concept,
largely because considerable experience and studies have been carried
out in the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany (OECD NEA 1977).
For disposal at depths not exceeding 1000 m, the favored emplacement concept is a mechanical mine, consisting of a horizontal
planar array of long pillars with the waste containers placed in
holes drilled in the floor of the intervening rooms (OECD NEA 1977).
Nodifications of conventional salt mining techniques could enable
emplacement at depths greater than 1000 m (OECD NEA 1977).
The major advantages of salt as a disposal medium are: its
ease of mining, its very low water content, its good thermal properties and its plastic characteristics, enabling it to flow and seal
any man-made penetrations or any faulting that may occur.

Also,

technology for such a disposal scheme is currently available (OECD

NEA 1977).
The major disadvantages of salt as a disposal medium are:
its value as a natural resource (which may lead to mining at some
future time), its l.ow sorption capacity, and its high solubility in
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water (only important if water gains access to the disposal zone,
which is unlikely if the salt formation is sufficiently large or is
protected by thick layers of shales) (OECD NEA 1977).
Disposal in Clays

L

Some clays (argillaceous formations) are characterized by a
high plasticity which should, like salt formations, enable containment to be maintained even in the case of faulting.
reliability comparable with that in salt

~vould

A containment

be expected, but in-

vestigations into clays have been very limited (OECD NEA 1977).

The

main concern with argillaceous materials is the behavior and fate
of the large amounts of water which they usually contain.

Suitable

clays would have to contain at least 15-20% water to be sufficiently
plastic.

However, this water usually moves

~vith

extremely lo"tv velo-

city or not at all and therefore may not contribute significantly to
radionuclide movement (OECD NEA 1977).
Clays have significant advantages over salt as a disposal medium due to their high sorption capacity, their insolubility, and a
very low corrosion rate of waste containers (OECD NEA 1977).

Clays

have, on the other hand, the disadvantages of a lower thermal conductivity than salt (by a factor of two) and being rather more difficult to mine (OECD NEA 1977).
However, the technology for emplacement in clays, using a
conventional mine or a matrix of drill holes, is available (OECD
NEA 1977).
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Disposal in Hard Rock

t
Rocks considered as media for disposal of radioactive wastes
include: granite, basalt, limestone, anhydrite, and metamorphic
rocks.

Such rocks are impervious when massive, but are often inter-

sected by a network of joints and fractures and are thus able to
transmit large amounts of water.

However, hard rock formations con-

training little or no circulating groundwater do exist, usually as a
result of particular geological situations, such as the secondary
sealing of fractures or the isolation from aquifers by impermeable
beds (OECD NEA 1977).
Even if faulting were to lead to limited contact between
waste and groundwater, this would not necessarily imply a serious
loss of isolation because further barriers are afforded by the waste
itself and by retarded migration through the surrounding strata.

In

addition, preliminary analyses have indicated that the consequences

(in terms of exposure of man) of containment failure for repositories
deep in the earth's crust are small, provided that failure does not
occur during the first few hundred years after disposal and that
account is taken of sorption, dispersion, dilution and other processes that hinder the transfer of nuclides through geological formations (OECD NEA 1977).
Emplacement concepts and the technology for drilling or mining
these rock formations are readily available.

Mlning costs may be

greater than those for salt formations although disposal at greater
depths would be possible (OECD NEA 1977).

Rock types which are wide-
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spread at the surface and \vhich are not likely to constitute or contain valuable resources, may offer advantages (from the point of
vie\v of the risk of future intrusion by man) over salt formations.
Ocean Disposal

Two concepts for disposal of radioactive wastes in the ocean
have been considered: disposal on the ocean floor and sub-seabed
disposal.

Disposal on the Ocean Floor
The emplacement of carefully conditioned long-lived waste

(including high-level

\~aste)

on the ocean floor has been proposed by

some as a disposal option (OECD NEA 1977).
The technical feasibility of this concept depends on the ability to produce solid matrices capable of providing long-term containment \vith the necessary reliability.

If containment can be assured

over the hazardous lifetime of most fission products, environmental
assessments so far available indicate that the ocean could receive
very large amounts of actinides and of the remaining long-lived fis-

sion products without deleterious effects for man and his environment
(OECD NEA 1977).

Ho\vever, much improved data on the behavior of the

critical nuclides in the marine environment are required before final
conclusions can be made.
It should be noted that, although

lo~.;-and

intermediate-level

solid wastes (containing relatively small quantities of long-lived radionuclides) are already disposed of in this manner, the "London Con-
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vent ion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 1-las tes
and Other Hatter" prohibits the disposal on the deep ocean floor of
high-level \vastes (OECD NEA 1977).
Sub-Seabed Disposal

L,

In the sub-seabed disposal concept, radioactive waste could

be emplaced either in the unconsolidated sediments or in the underlying bedrock.

Disposal in the bedrock would present much greater

technological difficulties \vithout any appreciable gain from the
vie\.;point of reliability of waste isolation (OECD NEA 1977).

Con-

sequently, interest is concentrated on the layer of unconsolidated
sediments (OECD NEA 1977).

The preferred areas appear to be in the mid-plate regions of
the deep ocean floor.

In general the distance from the plate boun-

dary would provide assurance of long term tectonic stability.

The

waste would in this concept be placed under the ocean bed in the unconsolidated sedimentary cover which is mostly composed of red
clays ( OE CD NEA 19 7 7) •
Sub-seabea disposal offers a number of attractive features:
remoteness from man, potential long-term containment of waste with
a reliability characteristic of the geological disposal concepts,
the overlying ocean provides an enormous dilution potential for any
activity released, and feasibility seems to be within the scope of
present technology (OECD NEA 1977).
Balancing the advantages, hotvever, is the lack of knowledge
of the ocean floor.

Further, there are problems caused by the need

for considerable transportation and precise placement of the wastes,
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the danger of transport of released waste by seawater, the possibility of biological accumulation of radionuclides by sea life, and
international political uncertainties (Eichholz 1977).
Summary of Disposal Alternatives
Of the alternatives for high-level radioactive waste disposal
discussed above, disposal in deep geological formations on land is
the favored method for the immediate future.

Of the three disposal

media (clay, hardrock, and salt) considered, salt is the favored
concept because considerable studies have been done in this area.
Ho\vever, hardrock is also being studied closely as a possible disposal medium.
Other concepts such as partitioning for reuse and transmution
are concepts whicl1 could be useful in the more distant future.

In

the case of transmutation, the radioactivity of the wastes would be
lowered and the inventory of fissile resources would be effectively
increased.

Space disposal may be feasible in the future for the

more toxic and longer lived radionuclides, providing launch reliability can be assured and the economics worked out.

Disposal in the

Antarctica ice sheet may be feasible, but more study is needed.
Likewise, sub-seabed disposal may have much to offer due in part to
its enormous dilution potential.

Storage in engineered facilities

on the surface is important for short term storage, but is not acceptable for ultimate disposal.
In light of the fact that radioactive waste disposal in geolo-
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gical formations on land is currently the favored concept, it is
desirable to examine the major design considerations for this disposal alternative. These design considerations are the topic of the
follo\.Jing chapter.

CHAPTER V

MAJOR DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISPOSAL
IN GEOLOGICAL FQB}~TIONS ON LAND
Detailed procedures for disposal of high-level and other longlived (including transuranic) wastes are being formulated by the NRC
'

and are scheduled for publication early in 1979 (NRC 1978b).

However

it is generally accepted that disposal in geological formations on
land is the most likely concept to be used in the near future (Gilmore 1977).

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to review some

major considerations in the design of high-level radioactive 'tvaste
disposal facilities.
The

~-.Taste

Form

The actual nature of radioactive waste destined for geological disposal will depend on the reactor fuel cycle used (whether or
not the fuel has been processed to recover uranium and/or plutonium)
and subsequent treatment to produce a solid phase.

Assuming a

scheme with uranium and plutonium recycle, ho,vever, Table 13
some of the characteristics of some likely waste forms.

sho~vs

Indications

are that wastes will be incorporated into a borosilicate glass (similar to Pyrex) due in part to the low leachability (Table 13) of
this waste form (Cohen 1977b).
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bMultiply by 0.578 to get BTU/(hr-ft-F 0 )

aProduced by either spray of fluidized bed calcining followed by melting, or by in-canister
vitrification processing.

SOURCE: Geoffrey G. Eichholz, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power, (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Ann Arbor Science, 1977), p. 581, table 167.
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The solidified waste will probably be fabricated into the
form of cylinders about 300 centimeters long and 30 centimeters in
diameter.

Each glass cylinder will in turn be sealed inside a

thick stainless-steel casing.

These dimensions are dictated largely

by heat transfer problems (Cohen 1977b).

Such waste containers

will be shipped to a federally operated repository for burial.
One year's wastes from a single 1,000-megawatt nuclear power
plant will go into 10 such canisters, and the canisters will be
buried about 10 meters apart; hence each canister will occupy an
area of 100 square meters, and all canisters will takeup up 1,000
square meters (Cohen 1977a).

It has been estimated that an all-

nuclear U.S. electric-power system would require roughly 400 1,000
megawatt plants capable of generating 400,000 megawatts at full
capacity (Cohen 1977a).

Accordingly the total high-level wastes

generated annually by an all nuclear U.S. electric-power system
would occupy an area of less than half a square kilometer.
Thermal Considerations
The main reason for spreading the canisters over such a large
area is to dissipate the heat generated by their radioactivity
(Cohen 1977b).

The problem of dealing with this heat can be sub-

stantially alleviated by waiting for 10 years after the reprocessing
operation, at which time the heat generated by each canister will
have fallen off to about 3. 4 kilowatts (F lgure 2).
The advantage of delayed burial is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. The advantage of delayed burial is evident in this
graph, in which the heating effect of a single waste canister is
translated into the estimated rise in temperature that would result
at the surface of the canister if it were buried alone in rock of
average thermal conductivity. The numbers labeling each curve indicate the heat generated by the canister (in kilowatts) after a
given interim-storage period (in years). For temperatures above the
dashed line (700°C), glass devitrifies (crystallizes and becomes
brittle).
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive
Wastes from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (June 1977):

26.
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Figure 3 translates the heating effect into the estimated rise in
temperature that

~v-ould

result at the surface of a canister buried

alone in rock of average thermal conductivity.

Burial after a wait

of a year ~.,ould lead to a temperature rise of 1 ,900°C, whereas

waiting 10 years would reduce the rise to 250°C.
critic~l

The difference is

since glass devitrifies (crystallizes and becomes brittle)

at temperatures higher than 700°C (Cohen 1977a).

In rock of average

thermal conductivity the maximum average temperature of rock just
above and below the burial depth would be reached 40 years after
burial, when the average temperature at the burial depth \vould be
increased by 140°C (Figure 4) .

If the canister were to be buried in

salt, which has a much greater thermal conductivity, the rise in
temperature at the burial depth after 40 years would be less: 85
degrees (Cohen 1977a).

In salt an additional effect must be taken into account, since
'

the heat will cause the migration of water tntvard the waste canister

(Cohen 1977a).

Typical salt formations contain about 0.5 percent wa-

ter trapped in tiny pockets (0.1 to 1.0 mm in size).

The solubility

of salt in water increases with temperature, so that if the temperature on one side of a pocket is raised, more salt will go into solution on that side.

This raises the salt content of the water above

the saturation point for the temperature on the opposite side of
the pocket, however, causing the salt to precipitate out of solution
on that side.

The net effect is a migration of the water pocket in

the direction of the higher temperature, which is of course in the
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direction of the buried \vastes.

The rate of migration depends on the

magnitude and duration of temperature gradients created in the salt
abound the waste.
This process is eJ..-pected to lead to the collection of 'tvater
around each canister at an initial rate of two or three liters per
year; a total of 25 liters collecting \vi thin 25 years, with very
little further collection expected thereafter (Cohen 1977a).

The

water arriving at the canister \vould be converted into steam and
would be dratm off by the ventilation system (if the repository is
not sealed).

Small amounts of water would continue to migrate to-

ward the canisters after 25 years carrying corrosive substances
such as hydrochloric acid arising from chemical reactions induced in
the salt by the radiation from the canisters (Cohen 1977a).

It is

therefore usually assumed that the stainless-steel casings will corrode at.;ay, leaving the waste-containing glass cylinders in contact
with the salt (Cohen 1977a).

However, this is expected to be a

slow process and container integrity should be maintained for an
indefinite (but evidently finite) period of years (Eichholz 1977).
Residence Time Requirement
The basic underlying idea in the disposal of radioactive
waste is to isolate the waste from man until the radioactive isotopes have decayed to insignificant levels.

Thus, the necessary

detention time will be a function of the cumulative effects of the
radionuclides present and their half-lives (Table 10).

79
10

,..........

10

8

10 6

7
10

tf)

.u

5
(1.)
~

+J
("\3

~
'-'

10

6

Q)

10 4

C/}

10

5

C/}

10 3

("\3

~

10

~

•r-1

Q)

.u
.u

10

t.H

0

c0

10

~

s::P::

~

co

QJ

1>-'

"0

Cd

Q)

H

~
Cl:l

H

10

Q) Q)
0..~

H
Q)

rJ)

0

.u
..c
+J

0..
~

cC1j

•r1

Q)

00
H

~

0
• '"d

/

2

0

Cl:l

(J

C/)

;:3

0

~

.~

Total

3

~

"0

::::

c

~ ~

4

"0

·g

co

r-it.-'

("\3
~

en
.urcs
Q)

~
("\3

p::

~

ro

1

Q)

~

Q)

~
~

10-l
Io- 2

1

10

10 2

10 3

104

10 5

10 6

10 7

Years After Reprocessing
Fig. 5. Gamma ray energies emitted per second by various radioactive isotopes in the wastes resulting from one full year of allnuclear U.S. electric-power system are plotted according to the
scale at left. Scale at right indicates the total number of fatal
cancers expected per year if the source of this amount of gamma radiation were to be spread at random over entire land surface of U.S.
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (Jtme 1977): 27.

80
Figure 5 sho\.JS the gamma-ray energy emitted per second (in
watts) by the wastes from reprocessing r~sulting from one full year
of a U.S. energy budget (400 1,000-megatvatt plants) based on allnuclear generation of electric potver, and the potential hazard in
n~~ber

of fatal cancers per year induced, if this amount of gamma

radiation Here to be distributed over the entire land surface of
the U.S.

Note that the hazard (number of fatal cancers per year)

is reduced by about five orders of magnitude in about the first
600 years.
Figure 6, simil2rly shaHs the potential hazard in number of
fatalities if all t.Jastes from reprocessing tvere ingested or dumped
at random into rivers throughout the U.S.

The potential hazard is

reduced by about four orders of magnitude in about the first 6001000 years.
On the other hand, Figure 7 shotvs that if all wastes were in-

haled the potential hazard is reduced by only about 2 orders of magnitude in the first 1,000 years after removal from the reactor.
It seems reasonable in the case of disposal by deep burial
in geological formations that the most likely path for radionuclides
to return to man t.;ould be by ground water contamination.

Thus ex-

posure by ingestion tvould be the most likely risk due to return to
the environment by ground\vater movement.

In

this

case, after 600

years, a person tvould have to ingest approximately a half pound of
the buried waste to incur a 50 percent chance of suffering a fatal
cancer (Cohen 1977a).

Cohen (1977a), making two basic assumptions,

(random burial across U.S. at depth of 600 ft and an equal escape

Fig. 6. If all wastes were to be ingested, the biological
effects on the human population of the U.S. would be considerable.
As this graph shows, the number of cancer-causing doses in the
,.,astes produced by one year of all-nuclear electric po'tver in the
U.S. is such that if all the wastes, after aging for 10,000 years,
·Here to be converted into digestible form and fed to people, one
·would expect a million fatal cancers to ensue (scale at left). If
instead the wastes were to be converted into soluble form and immediately after reprocessing dumped at random into rivers throughout
the U.S., the result could again be a million fatalities (scale at
right).
SOURCE: Bernard L. Cohen, "The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
from Fission Reactors," Scientific American 236 (June 1977): 28.
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prob~bility

for atoms of waste and radium at the same depth) pre-

dicts 10- 6 fa tali ties per year after the first fe~v hundred years of
storage and 0.4 fatality for the first million years.
In light of the foregoing discussion it seems reasonable that
a minimum residence time for disposal of reprocessed waste should be
on the order of 600 years.

If reactor wastes are not processed to

recover plutonium and uranium, then this minimum time would have to

be increased to thousands of years (Deese 1978).

As a goal, wastes

should be confined for several million years, thus reducing health
hazards to the level of that of the original uranium ore used for
fuel (Figures 6 and 7).

As a further guide, it seems reasonable that

isolation times should generally be such that (when other factors
such as dilution are considered) concentrations reaching the environment do not exceed the maximum permissible concentrations for radionuclides listed in Table 12.
The }fultiple Barrier Concept
As mentioned in chapter four, geological disposal employs the

concept of multiple barriers consisting of . first) man-made barriers
(the waste form, the container, and the backfill) and next, natural
barriers (the surrounding geological media).

Each barrier imposes

a time delay on the return of radionuclides to the environment.
The Haste Form as a Barrier

Once exposed) the most important question concerning the behavior of any waste form is the rate at which radionuclides will be
leached and transported away in the ground'\vater (Apps 1978).
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The leaching rate for any given nuclide is a function of
(1) the surface leDching rate, (2) the diffusion of the nuclide away
through the surrounding water and water saturated backfill material,
(3) the rate of r3dioactive decay, and (4) transport from the site
by groundtvater migration through the fractured rock (Apps 1978).

Deternination of the rate controlling step(s) in this complex systern must be made if leaching rates over long time spans are to be
predicted.

It is not possible to place any definite time limits on

the rate of leaching of radionuclides over long time periods because
not enough is yet knot-.-rn about the kinetics of the various processes
(Apps 1978).

HoHever, much of the current evidence supports lotv

leaching rates, and hence

lo~v

ultimate rates of removal of the radio-

nuclides from the storage (disposal) site (Apps 1978).
Apps (1978) estimates that if a spent unreprocessed fuel \vaste
canister (300 em long by 30 em in diameter)

~vere

to contain 1 weight

percent of a very-long lived nuclide of average molecular weight
(say 100), complete leaching would occur in bet\veen 4. 45 x 10
4.45 x 10 14 years.

0

and

Other estimates indicate that a cylinder of

borosilicate glass 0.75m high and 0.5m in diameter might take 20 to
200 million years for 99 percent of the initial load of radionuclides
to be extracted (de Marsily 1977).

The wide variation in estimates

is due to the wide range of groundt..rater flo'tv and \vaste characteristics possible.

Obviously, more refined models are needed to pre-

diet leaching rates.

In particular, the rate-controlling step(s)

must be identified and the expected maximum concentration attainable
in solution must be determined for the given radionuclide (Apps 1978).
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This in turn will determine the mass flux of the radionuclide that
could be affected by subsequent barriers.
Ho~vever,

de Marsily (1977) has suggested that a more impor-

tant question may be that of the stability of glass for the long
time periods required, as this could, in turn, drastically alter
expected leaching rates.

Although some examples of man-made glass

as old as a few thousand years exists, man's experience with glass
in a thermal and radioactive environment, such as exists in a highlevel radioactive waste form, is considerably shorter.

Thus the

ability to make predictions as to the behavior of glass over time
periods required for radioactive waste disposal is in doubt.
Other desired characteristics of solidified waste of primary
importance (in addition to lrnv leachability by water and stability)
include: (1) high thermal conductivity, (2) mechanical ruggedness,

(3) noncorrosiveness to container, (4) minimum volume, and (5) minimum cost.

TI1e major characteristics of the principal solidified

waste forms in the U.S. are presented in Table 13.

On the basis of

low leachability and high thermal conductivity, it appears that
borosilicate glass would be the best choice for a waste form.
Although more study is needed, it seems reasonable to expect
that a waste form can be produced which will last at least the first
thousand years, adequate time for most of the fission products to
decay away.
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The Canister as a Barrier
The first line of defense against the release of radionuclides
is the waste canister containing the solid waste form.
It is generally expected that the useful life of metal containers of solidified wastes will be much longer than the 15 to 40
years typical for liquid wastes (Eichholz 1977), and can probably

last on the order of several hundred years (de Marsily 1977).

How-

ever, much longer times may be made possible by other choices of materials.

For example, laboratory studies have demonstrated that

leaching rates of corundum (a corrosion resistant ceramic) are very
slo~.,

under near neutral pH's and near ambient temperatures, on the

order of lo-1 1 Kg-m-2-sec-l (Apps 1978).

A container of corundum O.lm

thick ~vould take approximately 10 6 years to leach but, intergranular
attack, radiation damage, and higher temperatures may appreciably

shorten container life (Apps 1978).
It should be noted, however, that ceramics are far more prone
to breakage than ductile materials such as copper or stainless steel.

Therefore, if ceramics are to be used, some means of preventing
stress buildup about the container due to ground movement must be
incorporated in the overall design of the repository.

Otherwise,

premature release of the radionuclides may occur.
Further, current policy requires retrievability of wastes
and storage at a single centralized facility (lOCFRSO, App. F).

An

inherent weakness in this policy is that where retrievability is

possible, the risk of unauthorized retrieval becomes apparent (Gil-
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more 1977).

It is believed that, if a safe and effective ultimate

disposal method can be proven, the requirement for retrievability
can be eliminated (Gilmore 1977).

In the mean time, however, the

retrievability requirement demands container integrity for an indefinite number of years.
Considering the issue of retrievability, it is desirable that
the canister have a

~nimum

life of perhaps a hundred years (assuming

that the retrievability requirement can be removed or that the wastes
have already been retrieved and disposed of alternatively by that
time~

Such a requirement may be a problem (at least for metal con-

tainers) in salt beds where it is increasingly difficult to retrieve
wastes effectively after about ten years (Deese 1978).

COnsidering

further, that 600 to 1000 years is adequate for almost all of the
fission products in waste to have decayed away, it would seem desirable to design a canister to last for 600 to 1000 years as a goal.
Longer times (perhaps 10,000 years) would be desirable, though perhaps not practical, for spent unreprocessed fuel because of the
greater amounts of the actinides present.
Chemically Sorbent Backfill as a Barrier
A third potential barrier to the release of radionuclides is

a backfill material or grout which modifies the chemical composition
of the invading groundwater, reacts with and sorbs leached radionuclides, and reduces still further the permeability of the local
storage area.

Various backfill materials have been proposed, in-

cluding cements, clays, sulfides, and serpentinite (Apps 1978).

All
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can act as chemical sorbents upon which migrating radionuclides would
be fixed, hopefully decreasing the concentration in the groundwater
to imperceptible levels (Apps 1978).

Deformable backfill materials

such as clays and serpentinite possess the advantage that they are
not subject to fracture under stress.

These could be extruded into

surrounding fractures under hydraulic pressure, thus effecting an
impervious seal where the repository host rocks lvould be most subject to increased breakage from excavation-induced stress' (Apps 1978).
A deformable backfill material could also relieve directional stress

around a canister, thereby decreasing the possibility of rupture
(Apps 1978).

The backfill material in salt mines could be crushed salt.
Salt tends to flo'v plastically when subjected to pressure.
is capable of sealing cracks that develop
(Eichholz 1977).

Thus it

from tectonic activity

This property of salt also removes the scars of

burial operations, leaving the canisters sealed deep inside a gigantic crystalline mass (Eichholz 1977).
The design of a suitable backfill material first requires an
understanding of the role it is to play.

If it is to be designed

primarily to retard radionuclide migration, the radionuclides requiring special attention must be identified and their solubility
and speciation in groundwater determined (Apps 1978).

The backfill

material should then be designed specifically to maximize sorption
of the species in solution.

This could be done by ensuring a large

surface area, many surface active sites, and special treatment to en-
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hance absorption (Apps 1978).

The backfill may also be designed to

be chemically stable with respect to the canister material, or to
react \vith water to provide an anhydrous environment..

Such backfill

materials would prevent corrosion of the exterior of the canister,
but of course \vould be no defense against corrosion by the waste ..
The Geological Formation as a Barrier
The geological formation presents the final barrier against
the leakage of radioactive waste to the biosphere, perhaps the only
one of significance on long time scales.
It is believed that the only likely means by which radioactive
materials may escape from an underground waste repository to the biosphere is by transport \vith grormdwater (Apps 1978).

The goal, then,

is to be able to select a site where the transport of the '1\.Yaste materials by the groundwater will be slo'\.r enough so that the eventual
release of toxic substances to the biosphere does not constitute a
hazard to life.
Permeability of a rock formation is one of the key factors
that controls groundwater movement, and one \..rould obviously prefer

a.

repository site where the rocks possess an extremely low p~~ab~lit:
(Apps 19 78).
Salt is generally believed to be the most satisfactory rodk
formation from this standpoint (Apps 1978).

Salt has an ~xtremely

low hydraulic conductivity (coefficient of permeability) ranging
from 10-ll to lo- 14 m/sec (Golder Associates 1978).
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It is often argued that the very presence of a stable thick
salt formation in itself provides evidence for the absence of
leaching from groundwater (Eichholz 1977).

The presence of such

salt formations, in fact, guarantees that no water was present in
the geological past (Eichholz 1977).

Time scales involved are typi-

cally on the order of a hundred million years (UCC-ND Engineering
1978).

It is also often stated that the demonstrated stability

refers only to past time and not to the future when conditions may
conceivably be different (Eichholz 1977).
all the groundwater now

flo~ving

However, if (for example)

in the region of the proposed Federal

waste-repository site in New Mexico were somehow directed to flow
through the salt, it would take 50,000 years for the salt enclosing
one year's deposit of nuclear wastes to be dissolved away (Cohen
1977a).

In light of this, predictions of confinement of wastes for

the first 1,000 to 10,000 years can be highly reliable for salt deposits.

Thus, in the case of salt, hydrogeological considerations

are not a major concern and one needs to focus on other factors,
such as the stability of salt at elevated temperatures (Apps 1978).
The discussion that follows is therefore applicable primarily to
argillaceous and crystalline {nonsaline) rocks.
Groundwater
In considering the importance of hydrogeology in storing
radioactive wastes in nonsaline rocks, two hydrologic regimes must
be considered: (1) the unsaturated zone and (2) the saturated zone.
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There have been some arguments proposed to support the concept
of storing radioactive wastes in a repository above the water table,
and thus in the unsaturated zone (Apps 1978).

The main rationale is

that fluid movement would be insignificant because of the low percentage of water in the pore spaces of the rock.

However, when cli-

matic changes increase annual rainfall or when extraordinarily heavy
storms occur, water saturations can rise above the immobile value
and the effectiveness of the zone as a barrier will be diminished or
lost (Apps 1978).

An additional problem involves the depth of burial.

Since the water table does not usually occur more than SOOm below the
surface, even in arid zones, the waste repository will have to be at
a shallower depth to be located within the unsaturated zone (Apps

1978).

Thus, if an upward movement of the water table should take

place because of changes in water saturations, the distance for radionuclides to reach the surface will only be a few hundred meters.

The

idea of placing a waste repository in the unsaturated zone, therefore,
requires one to demonstrate that, regardless of future climatic conditions, the residence time for groundwater within this zone will be
such that waste materials cannot reach the biosphere in hazardous
amounts (Apps 1978).
A better alternative, from the standpoint of predictability

of the hydrogeological behavior of the host rock, might be to search
for rock systems at depths in the saturated zone where flow paths
are long enough and velocities are low enough that migration can be
tolerated.

Of course, during the construction and filling of the
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repository with \vaste material, seepage of water will be into the
underground openings..
ground~.;ater

filled,

Hotvever, once the repository has been back-

"tvill saturate the system and movement will again

occur under the prevailing hydraulic gradients (Apps 1978).

The pro-

blem, then, becomes one of selecting a repository site in terms of
three key factors: (1) direction of grounm.;ater movement, (2) velocity of

ground~vater

movement, and (3) sorption of the transported

species (Apps 1978) .•
Direction of Groundwater Hovement
The direction of groundwater movement varies both laterally
and "tvith depth throughout a ground"tvater basin.

Hater moves from the

surface into underground layers in zones of recharge, which are the
topographically higher elevations within the drainage basin.

The

direction of movement is essentially do"tm\vard, and the depth of vertical penetration into the subsurface .depends on many factors (Apps
1978).

Eventually the movement becomes more or less horizontal un-

til a zone of discharge is reached.

In a discharge area flow lines

may turn upward until the water is discharged at the surface.

The

distance between the points of recharge and discharge ranges widely,
up to many tens of kilometers (Apps 1978).

Typically, for water moving through a homogeneous isotropic
media, the \-later-table configuration controls the location of recharge and discharge zones (Apps 1978).

Since the "tvater table is

often roughly parallel to the surface topography, the degree of topographic expression affects the size of recharge and discharge
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zones.

Flatter topographies tend to have larger recharge and dis-

charge zones resulting in longer flow paths (Apps 1978).
Another controlling factor is the degree of vertical inhomogeneity which would have an effect 'tvhen the rocks are stratified
into a sequence of layers of widely differing permeability (Apps
1978).
flu~.;,

The more permeable layers will act as major channels for
and therefore, their areal extent within a basin also contri-

butes to the location of recharge and discharge zones.
Since the lengths of flow paths can vary considerably, it is
important to understand the hydrogeology of a given basin in considerable detail in order to identify the complete flow field.
Presumably, the optimum location for a radioactive waste repository \vill be in a recharge zone where the flow path to the biosphere will be as long as possible.

Ho'tvever, since recharge and

discharge zones may change in the short term, one should look for
deep geological structures that favor long flutv paths

as these are

not likely to be affected by changes in climate or topography (Apps
1978).

The technology required for gathering the necessary field

measurements exists, but methods must be adopted to work in nearly
impermeable fractured rock systems at depths of several kilometers
(Apps 19 78).
Velocity of Groundwater Flow
The second key factor in the selection of a repository site,
that of determining the velocity of groundwater flow, is a much more
complex problem (Apps 1978).

The major problem is that the hydraulic
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conductivity, K, can vary by ten orders of magnitude from the surface to depths of thousands of meters.
For underground waste storage (disposal), one obviously \vants
to use

rock mass \vith a very lo\v value

3

or

hydraulic conductivity.

TI1us, salt has been considered to be the most satisfactory rock because of its very lo\.J intrinsic permeability,

In the case of argillaceous and nonsaline crystalline rocks,
the hydraulic conductivities of the undisturbed matrix can also be
very lo"-"·

For example, shale caprocks over underground gas storage

projects are routinely cored, and the measured hydraulic conductivities of the matrix are on the order of
1978).

lo- 13

to

lo- 14

m/sec (Apps

Claystones at the Savannah River Plant and Westerly granite

have hydraulic conductivities of the same order of magnitude (Apps
1978).

The corresponding velocities of flow· can be calculated from

the equation:
v

Khh/ <P

:=

where v is the effective velocity (sometimes called mean pore velocity) in m/sec, K is the hydraulic conductivity in m/sec, ~h is the

hydraulic gradient in m/rn and

~

is the porosity of the rock.

Thus,

for a hydraulic conductivity of l0- 13 m/sec, a hydraulic gradient of
0.001 m/m (a reasonable value), and a porosity of one percent, the
effective velocity of water lvould be 10-

14

m/sec or 3 x 10

-10

kilo-

meters per year; and is of no consequence even over time periods in
the millions of years (Apps 1978).

Movement by diffusion, alone,
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would lead to even

lrn~er

velocities.

However, where fractures exist as discontinuities in an essentially impermeable rock matrix, the overall permeability will be determined by the properties of the fracture network.

The creation of

a continuous fracture of even a 0.1 micron aperture can increase the
hydraulic conductivity by four orders of magnitude (Apps 1978).

The presence of fractures, however, does not necessarily mean
a substantial increase in hydraulic conductivity.

For example, micro-

cracks in intact Westerly granite with apertures from 0.01 to 10.0
microns and lengths from 0.075 to 250 microns have been measured
(Apps 1978).

The discontinuous nature of these microcracks explains

why the measured hydraulic conductivity of the Westerly granite is

only about 6 x lo-l3 m/sec (Apps 1978).
The size of a fracture (of the more continuous type) and the
subsequent hydraulic conductivity of a rock mass is a function of the
compressive stress in the rock mass.

It is necessary to know how

low the hydraulic conductivity of an undisturbed fracture can become as stress increases.

It is anticipated that the minimum value

will be approached asymptotically as stress increases (Apps 1978).
The stress level at which this value is first approached is therefore an important design parameter (Apps 1978).

In any case, the optimum situation is a massive body of
dense rock with a minimum of fractures.
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Sorption of the Transported Species
The third key factor in the selection of a repository site is
the effect of sorption chemistry on radionuclide migration rates
(Apps 1978).

The term "sorption" is used here to cover all aspects of interactions bebveen the mobile phase and the innnobile phase (solid plus
trapped liquid); this may include ion exchange, ion adsorption, filtration, and precipitation.

Sorption is commonly considered as a

reversible phenomenon that is a function of the concentration of all
elements in both phases (de Marsily 1977).

The sorption phenomenon

is also often assumed to be linear so that the concentration per unit
mass of the immobile phase, F, is linked to the concentration per
unit volume of the mobile phase, C, for each element by the relation:
F

= Kd C

where Kd is kno\m as the distribution coefficient relative to each
element and each type of rock (de Marsily 1977).

The greater the

distribution coefficient is, the greater is the concentration of the
immobile phase and the greater the effects of sorption on the migration rates of the radionuclides.
Moving groundwater will transport a radionuclide molecule only
when it is present in the aqueous (mobile) phase.

Thus, if the mole-

cules of a radionuclide in the groundwater are in reversible equilibrium with those that are sorbed, then they will migrate only for
the fraction of time they are in the mobile phase and will migrate
at a velocity only a fraction of that of the groundwater.
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Studies by Apps (1978) and de Marsily (1977) show that the
sorption characteristics of the rock are of major importance in the
selection of a repository site.

These characteristics will be de-

termined partly by the specific surface area of the rock, partly by
the minerals exposed at the surface, and partly by the chemistry of
both the

ground~vater

and the transported nuclide.

A high distribu-

tion coefficient is desirable.
The role of sorption in the isolation of radionuclides in a
repository will be illustrated further in the next section.
Illustration of the Confining Role of the
Geological Formation and Waste Form
To illustrate the confining role of a geological formation,
consider the five hypothetical formations listed in Table 14.
formations may represent any real type of rock.

These

Formation 1 (as it

turns out) has the 1;-lorst confining capacity and formation 5 is a
highly confining rock, almost completely impervious.

Only in a few

places in the world does such a formation as number 5 exist with a
thickness of several hundred meters (de }farsily 1977).
In all five cases the formations are assumed to be 500 m
thick in order to make comparisons possible.

Depth is not a con-

trolling parameter since doubling the thickness would only approximately double the time of confinement, while order of magnitude effects are of concern in this analysis (de Marsily 1977).
Flow is assumed in each case to be vertical at hydraulic graclients of 1/10 and 1/50.

Such a flow orientation and choice of hy-
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draulic gradients are probably conservative.
Table 15 shows the results of computations of transmission
rates for the formations (the percentage of transmission of radioactivity by the formation to the environment), and durations of transfer (time

~vhen

the maximum concentration of nuclide reaching the en-

vironment occurs) for the radionuclides: iodine-129, neptunium-237,
and plutonium-239.

These computations take into account radioactive

decay and distribution coefficient values, but neglect delays due to
the

~aste

form and waste canister (de Marsily 1977).

Note that com-

putations for plutonium-239 were done for two extreme cases of distribution coefficient values due to conflicting evidence on whether
plutonium is sorbed by rock formations (de Marsily 1977).
Clearly, in the case of very long lived radionuclides such as
iodine-129 for which the distribution coefficient is zero, the rock
formations are not effective barriers against the eventual return of
radionuclides to the environment (Table 15).

Only those long-lived

radionuclides with high distribution coefficients are effectively
retained by the formations.
On

the other hand, formations 4 and 5 retain radionuclides

even in the absence of sorption for periods of time (14,500 years
and 2,840,000 years respectively) completely adequate to allow for
the decay of most of the fission products in high-level radioactive
waste.

Only the long-lived nuclides (mostly actinides) will ever

reach the environment.
Further computations were done for the same five formations
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TABLE 15

TRANSMISSION RATES AND DURATIONS OF TRANSFER

Geologic
Formation

Mean Pore
Water Velocity
(m/ sec)

1. 6 x 10
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6
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SOURCE: G. de Marsily, E. Ledoux, and J. Margat, "Nuclear
Waste Disposal: Can the Geologist Guarantee Isolation?" Science 197
(August 1977): 524, table 4.
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Distribution coefficient, 0.

bnistribution coefficient, 15 ml/g.
cDistribution coefficient, 2000 ml/g.

Wl
(Table 14) by de Marsily (1977) to consider the effects of the waste
form.

The results are presented in Table 16 for two hypothetical

cases.

Hypothesis 1 assumes the structure of the glass* is never

damaged and the release of elements occurs only by diffusion through
the glass at a rate of lo-l6 m2 /sec for iodine and lo-18 m2/sec for
actinides.

Hypothesis 2 assumes that 10,000 years after burial, the

glass matrix structure is damaged, and the load of elements is released into the leaching water at a constant rate for 5000 years.
It is assumed in both cases that transport by water begins immediately.

If one wishes to assume that transport begins N years after

storage, all the results are to be delayed N years, taking into account, if significant, the radioactive decay of the elements during
that period.

The concentrations of the elements in the water flowing

across the upper boundary of the confining geological formation are
expressed (Table 16) as ratios to the maximum permissible concentrations in drinking water (Table 12).
It is readily apparent (Table 16) that the 10,000 year delay
provided by the waste form is significant in delaying the time when
the maximum concentration is observed in the case of the less confining formations.

It is also readily apparent (almost as a para-

dox) that the more confining the geological formation, generally
the more concentrated will be the long lived radionuclides in the

*The waste form is assumed to be a glass matrix of reprocessed wastes cast in a stainless steel container measuring 1 meter
in length and .5 meter in diameter; delay in release or radionuclides by the canister is neglected (de Marsily 1977).
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\vater coming into the human environment.

Thus, if the first barrier

(the glass and canister) is leaking and if the geology does not achieve tot31 confinement, then dilution is apparently needed; and the
greater the volume of

~vater

flo\ving through the repository, the less

toxic it Hill be (de Harsily 1977).
Thus, both residence time and dilution are ultimately governing factors in deciding \vhere to locate an underground repository
(in non-saline formations).

Of course, if residence time can be

guaranteed to be long enough (almost forever), dilution is not ne-:cessaDr; this would probably be the case for salt formations.
Site Suitability

The basic requirement for the suitability of any geological
fom.:1tion for the disposal of radioactive "tvastes is its capacity to
contain and isolate the radioactive material from the environment until the activity has decayed to non-hazardous levels.

As discussed

above, the thermal and hydraulic characteristics of the 'tvaste form,
the canister, the backfill, and the geological formation are key
factors in the isolation of the radionuclides.

Also as mentioned

previously, dilution may be a necessary requirement to further protect man from the return of radionuclides in harmful amounts.

These

factors and others will have to be considered in the selection of
high-level radioactive

waste repository sites.

The number of repository sites will be very small for the
foreseeable future, so each site will have to be considered individually and will be subject to different constraints.

Nevertheless,
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some generalized methodology has been developed in an attempt to
quantify weighting factors and safety considerations (Eichholz 1977).
nvo types of computations are required to determine the
safety of a given underground site.

These are:

(1) predictions of

the escape rates, leaching rates, and possible pathways to surface
for each type of

~vaste

deposited, and (2) the population exposure

resulting from an accident, such as rupture of shipping cask during
unloading at the site (Eichholz 1977).
To be a satisfactory site, Eichholz (1977) suggests that it
comply with certain geological criteria:

1.

burial site devoid of surface water and stable geomor-

phically
2.

ground water flo1v paths that do not lead to surface flow

3.

predicted residence time of radionuclides in the order

of hundreds of years (hydrologic system must be simple enough to
make possible reliable residence-time predictions)

4.

the highest water table several meters

belo~v

the burial

zone.
Eichholz (1977) also states that the basic data needed for site
evaluation include the following:

1.

depth to water table

2.

location and distance to points of 'tvater use

3.

minimum of 2 years precipitation and land pan evapora-

tion records
4.

water-table contour map for different seasons of the year
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5.

magnitude of annual water-table fluctuations

6.

detailed stratigraphic and structural data to base of

shallotvest confining aquifer
7.

base-flo'\v data on nearby perennial streams

8.

chemistry of water in aquifer, confining beds, and of

leachate from burial trenches
9.

laboratory measurements of porosity, permeability, miner-

alogy, and ion exchange capacity of each lithology in saturated and
unsaturated zones
10.

a record of at least 2 years of moisture content and

11

in

situ" soil moisture-tension in the upper 10 to 15 m of tmsaturated
zone at burial site
11.

three-dimensional distribution of heat to base of shallow-

est confining aquifer
12.

field test determination of storage coefficient and trans-

missivity
13.

definition of recharge and discharge areas

14.

field measurements of dispersion coefficient

15.

laboratory and field determination of the distribution

coefficient
16.

rates of denudation and slope retreat

L~ach

r~tes

soil

types and rock formations for years (Eichholz 1977).

and groundwater movement have been studied for various
But,

each site has its own conditions of groundwater movement, salinity
and soil conditions, stream erosion conditions,

sub&~en£es,

faul-
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ting and volcanism.

Because of the unusual long-term commitment a

repository represents, even rathet slow geologic processes must be
considered (Eichholz 1977).

The possibilities and consequences of

catastrophic events, such as meteoritic impact, volcanic activity
and disastrous floods, should be evaluated (Eichholz 1977).

How-

ever, concern over remote geological events involving time spans
greatly in excess of 3000-10,000 years (such as glaciation or major
climatic changes) would be unrealistic, as long as basic stability
criteria are met (Eichholz 1977).
Further, political-economic-and-operational factors should
also be considered in site selection.

A cost-benefit evaluation of

alternative sites and alternative disposal methods should be performed.

Maximum accident conditions should be considered aGd an

exclusion area concept imposed on the selected site (Eichholz 1977).
An appraisal of the accident potential for each process

~vould

be

needed; this normally would favor permanent, deep disposal over
retrievable sites (Eichholz 1977).

It would be prudent to establish

and follow through with a design verification procedure, to affirm
that the data on which the design was based adequately represents the
range of real conditions (Golder Associates 1978).

The repository

development operations should be separated from waste emplacement
operations and the repository developed as a series of modular units,
or mini-repositories, which could be developed, explored, approved,
and licensed in sequential fashion (Golder Associates 1978).

This

would allow operations to be halted at any time, for whatever reason,

W7
without prejudice to the security of the existing emplaced waste
(Golder Associates 1978).

Political issues include the participa-

tion of states in developing siting criteria (NRC 1978b).
The above site suitability factors are almost all site specific and each repository can be expected to be subject to different
constraints.

Even the required residence time for radioactive waste

can not be specified at this time, without consideration of the fuel
cycle waste management scheme used.

Thus, no attempt is made, here,

to give a detailed list of generalized criteria for high-level radioactive \vaste repository design or site selection.

However, the fore-

going discussion (in this chapter) may be considered as an introduction to some of the major factors to be considered in site suitability
studies and high-level radioactive waste repository design.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The potential environmental effects of the nuclear power industries are currently of much conem to the public and the (state
and federal) government.
Of the industries making up the light-water-reactor (LWR)
nuclear fuel cycle (Figure 1), only a few critical operations pose

a potentially significant environmental impact.

These involve: (1)

the radi urn daughters from uranium mill tailings, (2) the potver consumption entailed in enrichment processes, (3) the effluents (both
gaseous and liquid) from reprocessing plants, (4) the potential impact from long-term on-site storage of high-level radioactive

~vastes

at reprocessing plants, and (5) the lack of a final high-level
radioactive waste disposal method.

In the absence of processing of

spent reactor fuel to recover unburned uranium and plutonium, additional interim storage requirements at government storage centers

may pose further potential environmental impacts.
Current plans tend to,.;rard, ultimately, the processing of spent
fuel for recovery of unburned uranium and plutonium.

Thus, management

schemes for the disposal of radioactive wastes (Table 9, for example)
include consideration of high-level radioactive wastes from reprocessing of fuel.

Even in the absence of uranium and plutonium, recycle,

some processing of spent fuel 'tvould be required in preparation for
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ultimate disposal.

Ia either case, some method for ultimate dispo-

sal. of high-level radioactive waste is required, regardless of the
details of the radioactive waste management scheme adopted.

The

demands on any such management scheme and disposal method is expected
to increase (Table 11) over the next 20 years with projected growth
of the nuclear power

indust~ry.

The details of any final radioactive waste disposal scheme
will depend, in part, on the disposal method(s) adopted.

Disposal

alternatives considered include: ( 1) partition and recycle, (2) par-tition and transmute, (3) space disposal, (4) disposal in an ice
sheet, (5) retrievable engineered storage on the surface, (6) disposal in deep geological formations on land, and (7) ocean disposal.
Of these alternatives, disposal in deep geological formations on
land (particularly in salt formations) is currently the favored concept in the U.S., partly because more studies have been done on this
concept.

Ho\vever, other concepts (such as transmutation and seabed

disposal, for example) may be viable alternatives for the more distant future.
The basic underlying idea in the disposal of radioactive
waste is to isolate the waste from man until the radioactive nuclides
have decayed to insignificant levels.

It seems reasonable to define

"insignificant levels" to be such that any return of radionuclides
to the environment occurs in concentrations less than the maximum
permissible concentrations, Table 12.

As a minimum, 600 to 1000

years of isolation should be assured in order to allow for the
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decay of most of the fission products from LWRs.

On the other hand,

millions of years of isolation plus dilution by water may be required
to guard against the eventual return of longer lived radionuclides
(such as iodine-129) to the environment in significant amounts.

Thus, both residence time and dilution are key design considerations
in radioactive 'tvaste disposal.
In the design of high-level radioactive waste disposal repositories, many factors must be considered to assure isolation of radionuclides for the required time periods.

Some of the more significant

factors include the thermal, chemical and hydraulic characteristics
of the waste form, the canister, the backfill, and the geological
formation.

Over the long-term, it will be the geological formation

(vice man-made barriers) that must provide isolation of the radioactive waste.

In this regard,

the transport of radionuclides in

grounchvater is a major concern in repository design in the case of
non-saline rock formations.

The existence of a large stable salt

formation, on the other hand, is often cited as evidence of the
absence of grounch>Iater.

In this case, other considerations such as

the stability of salt at elevated temperatures is of more concern.
Indeed, a large body of data is required to characterize the geological formation and waste form and to establish site suitability.
The gathering of such a data base is currently one of the activities
being pursued by the NRC (Golder Associates 1978).
To date, the state-of-the-art in the disposal of high-level
and other long-lived radioactive waste in deep geological formations
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on land can best be described as developmental.

However, studies

generally support the premise that deep geological formations can
be found whi.ch are capable of confining wastes for the required
times.

In fact, predictions of confinement can be highly reliable

for the first 50,000 years (adequate time for almost all of the
fission products and a many of the actinides to decay to insignificant levels). For much longer periods of time (hundreds of thousands
or millions of years), predictability is far less certain.

However,

as has been noted by the NRC, as one projects fonvard in time and
confidence in predictions decrease, radiotoxicity decreases also
(NRC 1978b).

Thus, the key is to select and design sites within

deep geological formations for which the time, during which reasonable confidence in controls exists, is greater than the time required
for the waste toxicity to decrease below that of naturally occuring
bodies of ore, about 10,000 to 50,000 years (NRC 1978b).
criteria and regulations for high-level

radioac~ive

Design

waste disposal

are scheduled to be published early in 1979 (NRC 1978b).
At present, there is some justification for concern in the
area of high-level radioactive waste disposal; for no proven disposal method or detailed management scheme for these wastes currently
exist.

However, to date the problem of ultimate disposal has not

been imminent due to the requirement of a delay in disposal to allow
for reduction in decay heat (Figure 2 and Figure 3) of pe.r haps 10-20
years.

Nonetheless, the need for a safe disposal method is becoming

more pressing as time goes on and the inventory of high-level radio-
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active wastes grows.

Fortunately, much evidence supports the feasi-

bility of various disposal methods for the near future.

Federal

high-level radioactive waste repositories employing the concept of
disposal in deep geological formations (probably hard rock or salt)

appear

to be the most likely solution.
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